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INTRODUCTION 
The term “remix” is used mainly in a digital context, although there is 
nothing inherently digital about remix. For instance, fan fiction, a widely 
discussed form of remix, has developed into an important cultural 
phenomenon in the past forty years, clearly exhibiting a non-digital 
incubation period.1 Nevertheless, the digital revolution has been 
                                                                                                                     
 * Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University Law School (Yale Law School, J.D.; University 
of Chicago, M.A.; University of Illinois at Chicago, Ph.D.). I would like to gratefully acknowledge 
the research assistance of Justin Shuler and Nicole Soussan, the administrative assistance of Susan 
Button, and the editorial assistance of the staff of the Florida Law Review. I would also like to 
thank all those colleagues who have made construtive comments in all the various fora in which 
aspects of the arguments developed here were earlier presented. 
 1. See generally HENRY JENKINS, TEXTUAL POACHERS 162–77 (1992); Rebecca Tushnet, 
Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 651 
1
Hetcher: The Kids Are Alright: Applying a Fault Liability Standard to Amat
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
1276 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
transformational because the dramatic decrease in cost and ease of use of 
digital tools combined with a massive increase in availability of digital 
content to use as fodder for remixing has resulted in an explosion in the 
production of remix works.2 
Remix is a development of great cultural importance. Speaking purely 
aesthetically, digital remix allows for easy blending of genres of content—
music, video, text, photos, etc. not previously possible. Thus, not only is 
there the promise of more content from new sources but also wholly new 
forms of content. Leading media theorist Henry Jenkins aptly refers to the 
result as “convergence culture.”3 Politically speaking, remix facilitates 
democratic participation in the creation of culture to an extent not seen 
since the mega-media titans took over cultural production nearly a century 
ago.4 That this creative work is produced and shared by millions of 
everyday people cannot help but have desirable broad ramifications, as a 
variety of commentators have noted.5 
Digital remix is fraught with legal implications as well. On the one 
hand, it is a significant new source of original content, and accordingly, its 
emergence serves the fundamental goal of copyright, which is 
conventionally said to be the promotion of creative work.6 On the other 
                                                                                                                     
(1997) (discussing the increased use of fan fiction). 
 2. See Edward Lee, Warming Up to User-Generated Content, 2008 U. ILL. L. REV. 1459, 
1500–03 (“Web 2.0 applications now allow ordinary people to create expressive works of their own 
and to share them immediately with millions of others. In a recent Deloitte survey of 2,000 Internet 
users ranging in age from thirteen to seventy-five, close to half said they had created content—
blogs, music, photos, videos, and Web sites—for others to view online. In 2008, the number of 
blogs alone exceeded 112 million (although some may not be active). Nearly seventy percent of the 
people polled said they viewed the UGC of others.”); ee also Daniel Gervais, The Tangled Web of 
UGC: Making Copyright Sense of User-Generated Content, 11 VAND. J. ENT. &  TECH. L. 841, 870 
(2009). 
 3. HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE: WHERE OLD AND NEW MEDIA COLLIDE 16 
(2006). The roots of remix are in collage and thus can be traced back to one of Picasso’s early 
periods. See Tate, Glossary: Collage, http://www.tate.org.uk/collections/glossary/definition.jsp?ent 
ryId=70 (last visited Sept. 30, 2010); Guggenheim Collection, Collage, http://www.guggenheimcol 
lection.org/site/concept_Collage.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2010). Linguistic convention has yet to 
settle on one term. In usages roughly synonymous with the term, “remix,” one sees “user-generated 
content,” “UGC,” “mash-ups,” and “appropriation art.” To further the confusion, but hopefully for a 
point, I will introduce the term “amateur-generated content,” for reasons that will become apparent. 
 4. JENKINS, supra note 3, at 135–37. 
 5. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX : MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID 
ECONOMY 67 (2008) (explaining the democratic effects of read/write culture; id. (“For those of us 
who are not Posner and not Gil, the Internet is the one context that encourages the ethic of 
democracy that they exemplify. It is the place where all writing gets to be RW. To write in this 
medium is to know that anything one writes is open to debate.”); Lee, supra note 2, at 1504 (“UGC 
greatly facilitates both the freedom of speech and the freedom of the press.”); Tushnet, supra note 1, 
at 655–58 (explaining the personal utility derived from fan created fiction). 
 6. Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) (“The immediate 
effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an ‘author’s’ creative labor. But the ultimate 
aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.”); see Rebecca 
Tushnet, Economies of Desire: Fair Use and Marketplace Assumptions, 51 WM. &  MARY L. REV. 
2
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hand, because creating remix requires digital content as raw material, and 
much of this will naturally be owned by others and used without their 
(express authorized) consent, the issue of copyright infringement arises 
naturally.  
By the lights of a number of commentators, copyright law, at least in its 
current manifestation in the United States, is ill-suited to optimally regulate 
remix. Perhaps the most pervasive and troubling fear expressed among 
theorists is the potential for a “chilling effect” on the production of 
remix—particularly amateur remix—caused by a lethal combination of 
unenforceable legal doctrine and well-funded, aggressive corporate content 
owners.7 To the extent that this concern for chilling effects is well-
grounded, the issue is raised as to how copyright law might be altered in 
order to better regulate the exploding phenomenon that is remix. In this 
Article, I consider three alternatives. The first alternative is developed by 
leading Internet theorist Lawrence Lessig in an important and well-
regarded recent book aptly entitled, Remix.8 Quite strikingly, he argues that 
remix should be legalized.9 I will develop an alternative policy proposal 
that is equally, if not more, sweeping in its scope but which is also more 
practical and which coheres better with other aspects of copyright policy.  
The form of my argument has both positive and normative components. 
The positive legal argument is that, properly understood, amateur remix is 
predominantly fair use already.10 As such, it is legal already, not just at the 
margin but in the main. Thus, one of the three ways to legalize remix 
discussed in this Article is simply to provide the correct legal analysis—the 
legal truth shall set these unauthorized users free. Implicit in this claim, but 
worth noting explicitly, is the fact that while Lessig seeks to develop new 
policy for all remix, my concern is amateur-generated remix. The 
importance of drawing this distinction will become apparent in the course 
of this Article.  
With regard to the normative argument, I will suggest that copyright 
law should abandon its sole reliance on a strict liability standard for 
infringement and instead incorporate a tripartite liability standard, as is the 
                                                                                                                     
513, 517 (2009). 
 7. Steven A. Hetcher, Hume’s Penguin, or, Yochai Benkler and the Nature of Peer 
Production, 11 VAND. J. ENT. &  TECH. L. 963, 966 (2009) (“Because fan fiction and remix works 
build upon preexisting commercial works, typically without authorization, these latter works are 
potentially subject to infringement liability. Not surprisingly, creators of fan fiction and remix 
sometimes live in fear that their creations will cause them to be sued. This is bound to have, as the 
phrase goes, a ‘chilling effect’ on these creators.”). See generally Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 
572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (involving issuance of a takedown notice regarding a video 
of a YouTube member’s child dancing to a Prince song); LESSIG, supra note 5 (explaining the 
increase in copyright litigation both in the United States and Europe).  
 8. LESSIG, supra note 5 (discussing why our current copyright laws need to be changed). 
 9. LESSIG, supra note 5, at 254 (“[W]e need to restore a copyright law that leaves ‘amateur 
creativity’ free from regulation.”). 
 10. To lay my jurisprudential cards on the table, here I am adopting a Holmesian standard of 
law as a prediction of what courts will do. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 
HARV. L. REV. 457, 457 (1897). 
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case in tort law generally. Most important, I will argue that a fault standard 
will often be the appropriate standard to apply in the context of amateur 
digital remix. This proposed expansion in applicable liability standards 
will involve a rethinking of the normative desiderata that undergird 
copyright. There was a time when copyright policy was, in effect, treated 
as a form of industrial policy. Professor Jessica Litman has set out in detail 
the manner by which the 1976 Copyright Act was predominantly shaped by 
the set of relevant industry actors most likely to be financially impacted.11 
The story is that Congress largely accepted the set of rules that resulted 
from this modus vivendi of the combined content industries.12 In other 
words, the Copyright Act is aptly viewed as an instance of industrial policy 
set into law by a compliant Congress. One of the ancillary conclusions 
from the following discussion is that viewing the ambit of copyright 
appropriately regulated as industrial policy can no longer be justified—if it 
ever was—in the new media landscape in which great numbers of everyday 
technology users have become what commentators refer to as 
“creator/consumers.”13 
The monolithic economic framework that typically undergirds 
industrial policy is simply inadequate to correspond to the normative 
complexity that emerges when millions of everyday citizens are directly 
                                                                                                                     
 11. See generally Jessica Litman, Copyright Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. 
L. REV. 275 (1989) (discussing how historically copyright legislation has been formed by affected 
interest groups bargaining among themselves). 
 12. See Tim Hering, Comment, Users and Abusers: Has the Distinction Been Legislated out 
of Copyright?, 83 OR. L. REV. 1349, 1356–59 (2004). Hering describes the 1911 lawsuit 
surrounding the motion picture industry’s release of Ben Hur, a film based on a General Lew 
Wallace book. Id. at 1357. The Supreme Court found in favor of the publisher, causing the movie 
industry to seek a change in copyright law. The movie industry then put forth a bill to amend the 
Copyright Act in 1912. Id. There was initially little common ground between interested industry 
groups. The House of Representatives responded by encouraging industry parties “to negotiate 
privately and return with what they thought would be a fair solution.” Id. In March of that year, the 
parties came to an agreement and subsequently submitted a proposal to the House. Id. “[D] spite 
concerns over some of the proposals in the new bill, it was enacted with only minor changes.” Id. 
Hering explains that, “It is under this method of interest group wrangling that the current copyright 
statute was born.” Id. at 1359. He adds that the 1976 Copyright Act “bore some of the same 
hallmarks of its predecessor [the 1909 Copyright Act]: the Act’s provisions spoke to the narrow 
interests of individual copyright owners rather than to the general guiding principles of copyright.” 
Id. 
 13. Steven A. Hetcher, User-Generated Content and the Future of Copyright: Part One—
Investiture of Ownership, 10 VAND. J. ENT. &  TECH. L. 863, 875–76 (2008) (“The credo of modern 
art is art for art’s sake; this is UGC for UGC’s sake. There may be important implications of this 
fact for core issues of copyright as copyright assumes that people create due to the incentive 
provided by legal protections afforded by copyright law. Ergo, if no incentive is needed because 
people are motivated for art’s sake—so to speak, to create UGC—then the protections afforded by 
copyright law may be unnecessary . . . .”). See generally Jacqueline D. Lipton, Copyright’s Twilight 
Zone: Digital Copyright Lessons from the Vampire Blogosphere, 70 MD. L. REV. (forthcoming 
2010) (manuscript on file with author), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Delivery.cfm/SS 
RN_ID1597757_code691672.pdf?abstractid=1574460&mirid=1 (Select “One-Click Download” 
link) (noting the blurring lines between consumers and creators). 
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and significantly impacted by policies such as those that govern amateur 
remix. In particular, I will argue that owners of copyprotected works 
should no longer have the right to prevail in infringement suits against 
amateur remixers simply by establishing unauthorized copying of protected 
content (at least when the facts suggest a lack of “substantial certainty” of 
injury of a sort required for an intentional tort).14 The justification for this 
doctrinal shift will be derived by applying the sort of fairness arguments 
that have won the day—or rather, the modern era—in tort generally. 
Introducing elemental fairness concerns in this context will be seen to have 
classical adherents as ideologically diverse as Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes Jr., on the one hand, and Justice Benjamin Cardozo, on the other, 
and contemporary adherents as ideologically diverse as Judge Richard 
Posner and Professor William Landes, on the one hand, and Professors 
Jules Coleman, John Goldberg, and Benjamin Zipursky, on the other 
hand.15 As will be shown, taking fairness seriously in this manner has the 
salutary effect of mitigating or eliminating the purported “chilling effects” 
from the threat of infringement liability for the preponderance of amateur 
digital content, although this will be a (welcome) consequence of, rather 
than a justification for, taking fairness seriously.16  
The connection between taking fairness seriously and legalization of 
remix is as follows: The implication of applying a fault standard to 
putatively tortious behavior is that such behavior, sans negligence, is 
perfectly legal. The digital realm is united with the physical realm in which 
driving a car is legal so long as one does not negligently injure another. 
Thus, we have our third route to legalization of remix—the first, espoused 
by Lessig; the second, implicit in a proper understanding of fair use 
doctrine as applied to amateur digital remixing activities in the main; and a 
third, implicit in the policy proposal to expand and modernize the liability 
standard in copyright infringement.  
Part I of this Article will examine Lessig’s proposal to legalize remix. 
Part II will set out the first stage for the competing policy proposal to 
expand the number of liability standards in copyright by examining the 
broader theoretical connections between copyright infringement and tort 
liability generally. Part III will distill these top-down theoretical insights 
into a form applicable to a fair use analysis of amateur digital remix. The 
importance of this examination will be seen in Part IV, as the legal fact that 
                                                                                                                     
 14. See infra note 212 and accompanying text. 
 15. See, e.g., Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928). On the duty 
toward unforeseeable victims, the court wrote:  
One who seeks redress at law does not make out a cause of action by showing 
without more that there has been damage to his person. If the harm was not 
willful, he must show that the act as to him had possibilities of danger so many 
and apparent as to entitle him to be protected against the doing of it though the 
harm was unintended. 
Id. 
 16. For a discussion of these chilling effects, see Chilling Effects Clearinghouse, 
http://www.chillingeffects.org (last visited Sept. 30, 2010). 
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amateur digital content is predominantly a fair use is essential to 
understanding both why Lessig’s proposal fails and why the alternative 
succeeds.17  
I.  LESSIG’S ARGUMENT FOR LEGALIZING REMIX  
Lessig’s overall policy position on remix follows from his view that 
remix is in essence a victimless crime and moreover one with important 
social benefits. Under this set of assumptions, it is not surprising that 
Lessig is able to reach the conclusion that legal rules should support rather 
than impede remix culture to the full extent of legalizing the activity.18 
Lessig focuses on music mash-ups to make this point. He discusses the 
music mash-up artist, Girl Talk, who told Lessig in an interview that he 
could not understand why anyone would want to stop his music, since 
unlike “bootlegging,” it was not hurting anyone.19 Lessig notes, “Why 
anyone ‘should’ was a question I couldn’t answer.”20 As this statement 
indicates, Lessig can discern no harm from the activity such that anyone 
would want to stop it. Indeed, throughout the book, Lessig fails to 
acknowledge any harm that might result from remix. Silencio non est 
disputandum. Lessig instead emphasizes the manner in which remix 
culture creates social benefits. Lessig supports this final assumption 
through a variety of remarks. He claims that, 
[Remix] touches social life differently. It gives the 
audience something more. Or better, it asks something more 
of the audience. It is offered as a draft. It invites a response. In 
a culture in which it is common, its citizens develop a kind of 
knowledge that empowers as much as it informs or 
entertains.21 
Combining the above premises, Lessig derives the policy conclusion that 
remix cultural practices should not be impeded but instead supported by 
legal rules.22 
As the previous argument indicates, Lessig’s policy conclusion about 
remix turns crucially on his claim that remix is criminal. Lessig fails to 
acknowledge, however, that this claim is contestable. Therefore, it will be 
necessary to look in depth at the set of arguments Lessig offers to support 
his understanding of remix as criminal activity. If Lessig is right, we are in 
the midst of a crime wave on a massive scale—one that has a generational 
                                                                                                                     
 17. For an account of regulation through more informal means, see Steven A. Hetcher, Using 
Social Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix Culture, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1869, 1874–91 
(2009). 
 18. See LESSIG, supra note 5, at 254 (“[W]e need to restore a copy right law that leaves 
‘amateur creativity’ free from regulation.”); see also text accompanying note 9. 
 19. LESSIG, supra note 5, at 13.  
 20. Id.  
21.  Id. at 85. 
 22. See supra text accompanying note 9. 
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component. On Lessig’s account, it is young people, “kids,” who are by 
and large a generation of criminals.23 Lessig is sympathetic, viewing these 
“kids” as victims of the era in which they have come of age.24 Note, 
moreover, that since it is the emergence of ever easier to use technologies 
that is creating a secular trend toward this brand of criminal behavior, a 
sobering implication of Lessig’s argument is that future generations of kids 
will be increasingly inclined toward a life of crime.  
Lessig’s assumption that the rising kids of this generation are criminals 
itself follows from two assumptions: first, that unauthorized remixing of 
online digital content is criminal; and second, that the rising generation of 
kids use their computers largely for remixing activities. Regarding both 
assumptions, Lessig writes,  
In a world in which technology begs all of us to create and 
spread creative work differently from how it was created and 
spread before, what kind of moral platform will sustain our 
kids, when their ordinary behavior is deemed criminal? Who 
will they become? What other crimes will to them seem 
natural?25  
In a statement that highlights the second assumption, Lessig claims that 
we should “reform the rules that render criminal most of what your kids do 
with their computers.”26  
Lessig further argues that turning kids into criminals will have 
deleterious effects on them and on society, as kids will learn to disrespect 
the law and consequently engage in more criminal activities.27 Lessig 
writes,  
I worry about the effect this war is having upon our kids. 
What is this war doing to them? Whom is it making them? 
How is it changing how they think about normal, right-
thinking behavior? What does it mean to a society when a 
whole generation is raised as criminals?28 
Lessig goes so far as to suggest that this generational turn toward crime 
may become dangerous: “I then want to spotlight the damage we’re not 
thinking enough about—the harm to a generation from rendering criminal 
what comes naturally to them. What does it do to them? What do they then 
do to us?”29 
Comparing remixing to file-sharing, Lessig asks,  
                                                                                                                     
 23. LESSIG, supra note 5, at xvii. 
 24. Id. at xviii.  
 25. Id.  
 26. Id. at 19. 
 27. Id. at xvii. 
 28. Id.  
 29. Id. at 18. 
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Should we continue the expulsions from universities? The 
threat of multimillion-dollar civil judgments? Should we 
increase the vigor with which we wage war against these 
“terrorists”? Should we sacrifice ten or a hundred to a federal 
prison (for their actions under current law are felonies), so 
that others learn to stop what today they do with ever-
increasing frequency?30  
Lessig argues that the criminal status of remix has other deleterious 
social consequences as well, such as deterring the development of new 
forms of literacy. He argues,  
[T]he law as it stands now will stanch the development of the 
institutions of literacy that are required if this literacy is to 
spread. Schools will shy away, since this remix is 
presumptively illegal. Businesses will be shy, since rights 
holders are still eager to use the law to threaten new uses.31 
Reasonably taking it as the implicit premise that institutions of literacy 
should not be deterred, Lessig concludes that laws against remix culture 
should be dispensed with in order to avoid these undesirable outcomes. 
As each of the above instances indicates, the cornerstone of Lessig’s 
overall argument is the claim that amateur remix is criminal activity. Thus, 
it is essential to determine the accuracy of Lessig’s legal analysis of remix 
because if he is wrong regarding its criminality, then there may be no 
reason to fear the undesirable social consequences he foretells. I will argue 
that Lessig’s claim that amateur remix is criminal is incorrect. In Part III, I 
will argue that this is true for the simple reason that significant amounts 
and types of remix works are in fact fair uses. A use that is fair is not an 
infringement and a fortiori not a criminal infringement. 32 In order to fully 
appreciate the role of fair use in this argument and subsequently in the 
proffered alternative, it will be necessary to engage in some fundamental 
analysis into the theoretical underpinnings of copyright infringement. 
                                                                                                                     
 30. Id. at xviii.  
 31. Id. at 108. 
 32. See generally 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (providing that fair use does not constitute 
copyright infringement). Moreover, even if remix sometimes failed to qualify as fair use, there is a 
strong argument that the creators of these works will not be subject to criminal liability under the 
No Electronic Theft (NET) Act because remix work would rarely meet the $1,000 threshold value 
and in many cases the work’s owner  would have difficulty proving there was willful infringement 
as required under the statute. Hetcher, supra note 17, at 1899–990 & n.114. Lessig does not discuss 
the NET Act despite the fact that it added criminal provisions for non-commercial activities and 
thus on its face is salient in the context of remix, much of which is non-commercial. As stated in 
Using Social Norms, “Lessig’s frequent references to the criminalization of a generation imply a 
belief that these remixers do, or will, violate the NET Act.” Id. at 1899–1900 n.114; see, e.g., 
LESSIG, supra note 5, at 283–84 (arguing that children have been branded “pirates” and comparing 
them to Soviet “black marketeers”). 
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Next, it will  be clarifying to provide the first stage of the two-stage 
argument that will be propounded as an alternative to Lessig’s proposal 
that remix be legalized. This first stage provides an argument for changing 
the liability standard in copyright. Once this position has been developed, 
discussion will then return to the topic of fair use in the context of amateur 
remix. The connection between these strands of argument is that it turns 
out that remix is the factual setting that is most supportive of the need for a 
tripartite liability standard, as it is in the context of amateur remix that fair 
use goes from being the exception to being the rule. I will argue that this 
shift has direct implications for the relevance of applying a fault standard 
because unauthorized uses in this context are no longer substantial 
certainties but instead mere risks.  
II.   COPYTORT &  AMATEUR DIGITAL REMIX  
I coin the term “copytort” to make a point about what I see as the lack 
of sophistication in copyright theorizing with regard to certain issues that 
are only best understood by bringing to bear elements of tort law and 
theory. In short, copytort is copyright that takes tort seriously. The 
following discussion will only develop as much copytort theory as is 
necessary for the present purpose, namely, the development of a more 
sophisticated understanding of amateur digital remix. In the concluding 
remarks, I will indicate some directions in which copytort, understood as a 
top-down theoretical approach, can be, and should be, further developed. 
This is in keeping with a methodological approach first developed 
elsewhere.33  
Part II.A below will draw some basic connections between tort and 
copyright. Part II.B will then discuss the emergence of the fault standard in 
tort law generally and the normative evolution in tort law that brought 
about this emergence. Part II.C will then focus on abnormally dangerous 
activities, as they have traditionally served as an exception to the fault 
liability rule in tort generally, and thus, the issue arises as to whether 
copyright infringement is especially deserving of this minority rule for 
parallel reasons. 
Finally, the last Part II.D will examine trespass to land, which has often 
been invoked as an apt comparison when the strict liability rule is invoked 
in copyright.34  
A.  Background Connections Between Tort and Copyright  
Copyright infringement is a tort.35 In light of this uncontroversial legal 
fact, it is odd that, as a practical matter, copyright and tort law have little to 
                                                                                                                     
 33. See generally STEVEN A. HETCHER, NORMS IN A WIRED WORLD (2004) (arguing that 
legislators must consider social norms in order to effectively create copyright laws). 
 34. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Trespass-Copyright Parallels and the Harm-Benefit 
Distinction, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 66–68 (2009). 
 35. “Courts have long recognized that infringement of a copyright is a tort, and all persons 
concerned therein are jointly and severally liable as such joint tort-feasors.” Ted Browne Music Co. 
v. Fowler, 290 F. 751, 754 (2d Cir. 1923). 
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do with one another on an overt, doctrinal level. Lawyers are not typically 
taught to see the tort-related aspects of copyright. This claim is verified by 
the fact that copyright casebooks say little with regard to tort and tort 
casebooks say little with regard to copyright.36 This lack of conceptual 
overlap is unfortunate, however, as confusion may result. For instance, by 
failing to recognize copyright infringement as within the ambit of tort, tort 
scholars make statements about tort generally that would not be so 
obviously true were they to explicitly include copyright into the underlying 
subject matter under purview. For example, tort commentators sometimes 
note that recovery for pure economic loss is restricted in tort.37 Copyright 
infringement is presumably not considered when these comments are 
made. Recovery for economic loss is a core remedy in copyright, along 
with statutory damages.38 It is clear, then, that failing to take notice of 
copyright infringement carries the potential to lead astray commentary on 
tort. We will see that the reverse is true as well—that copyright can benefit 
from incorporating a more sophisticated understanding of tort law. 
The first issue is whether there might be a sound explanation for the 
disconnect between copyright and tort. One possible explanation for why 
tort and copyright are not much discussed together is because the former is 
a common law creation while the latter is a statutory creation. If this is the 
explanation, it is curious to note that standard definitions of tort do not 
include a common law origin as essential.39 A tort is aptly described as an 
injury for which civil redress is available.40 Such civil redress could come 
via statute instead of common law, however. In short, the fact that tort 
happened to emerge in the common law is no reason to think that such 
emergence is essential to tort. It is basic philosophical error to mistake 
coincident features with essential features.41 Punitive damage caps are 
perhaps the most important instance of this phenomenon.42 O ce again, the 
                                                                                                                     
 36. For example, the dominant casebook in tort, Prosser, contains no copyright cases, nor is 
copyright infringement an entry in the book’s index. Nor do the indices of leading copyright 
casebooks contain entries for core tort concepts such as “fault” or “negligence.” 
 37. MARC A. FRANKLIN &  ROBERT L. RABIN , TORT LAW AND ALTERNATIVES: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 268 (6th ed. 1996) (noting that “the courts have not protected economic interests as 
extensively as those involving physical security of [a] person and property . . .”). 
 38. 17 U.S.C. § 504(a) (2006) (providing the remedies for copyright infringement include the 
copyright owner’s actual damages and any additional profits of the infringer or statutory damages). 
 39. JOHN C.P. GOLDBERG, ANTHONY J. SEBOK &  BENJAMIN C. ZIPURSKY, TORT LAW: 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND REDRESS 14 (2d ed. 2008) (explaining “[t]ort law need not be judicial in 
origin”). The authors then give a series of examples of statutes creating and defining the “general 
parameters of tort liability.” Id. 
 40. Id. at 3 (“In sum, to commit a tort is to act in a manner that the law deems wrongful 
toward and injurious to another, such that the other gains a right to bring a lawsuit to obtain relief 
from the wrongdoer (or tortfeasor). Torts in turn refers to a collection of named and relatively well-
defined legal wrongs that, when committed, generate a right of action in the victim against the 
wrongdoer.”). 
 41. Cf. Anita Bernstein, Civil Rights Violations = Broken Windows: De Minimis Curet Lex, 
62 FLA. L. REV. 895, 908 (“[C]orrelation is not causation . . . .”). 
 42. See generally American Tort Reform Association, Punitive Damages Reform, 
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reverse is true as well; important copyright doctrines have emerged through 
common law processes. This is true for two of the most important and 
contentious doctrines in American copyright law: the doctrine of fair use 
and the set of doctrines that together make up indirect or secondary 
infringement.43 The overall point is that just as tort law is becoming more 
statutory, copyright law has a longer, more diverse history as a common 
law phenomenon than is commonly noted. Thus, any seeming common law 
versus statutory law divergence in origin between the two appears not to 
provide a conceptual basis for failing to seek a richer synthesis of tort and 
copyright. 
Another possible explanation is that these two areas of the law have 
little in common because the underlying subject matter is fundamentally 
different. Traditional tort concerns things tangible while copyright 
concerns things intangible. Tort law at its core is about sticks and stones 
and breaking bones while copyright is about the evanescent notions of 
unauthorized use of intangible expression. These types of property may 
reasonably be thought to obey fundamentally different laws. As property 
scholars going back to John Locke have long noted, a fundamental 
defining feature of property is scarcity.44 By contrast, creative works have 
no natural scarcity; once they exist, they exist for all unless copyright law, 
encryption, or some other means of creating an artificial scarcity can be 
devised.45 Thus, while copyright infringement may be a tort in some formal 
sense, yet, in practical terms, the divergent characteristics of tangible 
versus intangible property may mean that copyright and tort have little in 
common. On closer inspection, however, this argument is faulty. Tort has 
long protected intangible interests such as reputation and privacy.46 Thus, 
the distinction between tangible and intangible interests does not provide a 
                                                                                                                     
http://www.atra.org/issues/index.php?issue=7343 (last visited Sept. 30, 2010) (illustrating the 
various states’ statutory tort reform with respect to punitive damages). 
 43. See Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55, 61–63 (1911) (recognizing a form of 
contributory copyright infringement); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344–45 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) 
(No. 4,901) (establishing the common law doctrine of fair use); 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &  DAVID 
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 12.04[A][3] (rev. ed. 2010) (discussing the longstanding 
common law origins of contributory infringement). 
 44. Spencer A. Overton, Mistaken Identity: Unveiling the Property Characteristics of 
Political Money, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1235, 1258–59 (2000) (“Property is scarce. Real property is 
finite, and while opportunities to increase the total amount of personal property are being 
continuously discovered, individuals have access to, at any one time, a limited amount of personal 
property.”); see JOHN LOCKE, OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT: THE SECOND TREATISE 24 (Wildside Press 
2008). 
 45. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED 
WORLD 58–59 (2001) (explaining that, “[I]nformation is naturally nonrivalrous. If you use it, I still 
have as much left as before. It is also naturally nonexcludable.”). In turn, the law creates a 
monopoly right to remedy this problem. See also Hetcher, supra note 7, at 975 (“Creative works are 
non-rival in their consumption in as much as consumption by one person does not mean there is any 
less—of a book, for instance—to be consumed by another person.”). 
 46. See, e.g., 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558–59 (1977) (discussing tort law 
protection of reputation under the cause of action for defamation); id. § 652A (discussing tort law 
protection of privacy from invasions of privacy).  
11
Hetcher: The Kids Are Alright: Applying a Fault Liability Standard to Amat
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2010
1286 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 62 
 
rationale for jettisoning the project of seeking a better integration of tort 
and copyright.  
Surely, it is evidence that better integration is needed when one 
considers that a core battle in tort jurisprudence between the economists, 
the corrective justice theorists, and the civil recourse theorists47 finds 
almost no echo in copyright law. Yet the distinctions that divide these 
theorists48 would appear to have purchase in copyright as well.49 For 
example, to the extent that the purpose of tort is to allow victims of injuries 
to seek corrective justice for their injuries, a parallel justification would 
easily translate to copyright infringement—namely, the private cause of 
action for infringement provided by the statute can be seen as providing a 
mechanism for owners of infringed upon works to seek corrective justice 
or civil recourse for the wrong done to them.50  
We see, then, that the jurisprudence of copyright is insufficiently fine-
grained. There is an important debate in tort regarding the possibility that 
private tort suits as a whole are inefficient such that it would be welfare 
maximizing to administrate injuries in a different manner altogether, such 
as a social insurance system of the sort maintained in New Zealand. 
Coleman, for instance, has defended a corrective justice account of tort 
liability, and yet is open to a New Zealand model as well.51 For Goldberg 
and Zipursky, by contrast, the right to seek civil redress for private wrongs 
is at the core of what tort is about, and thus, it would not be an alternative 
to move to a system such as the New Zealand model that by-passes the 
availability of private redress.52 The obvious question is raised: say, if 
Goldberg and Zipursky are right, doesn’t this entail that the civil recourse 
                                                                                                                     
 47. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 91 GEO. L.J. 695, 
695–99 (2003). 
 48. See, e.g., Jane Stapleton, Evaluating Goldberg and Zipursky’s Civil Recourse Theory, 75 
FORDHAM L. REV. 1529, 1540 n.48 (2006) (construing that civil recourse theorists assert that “[a] 
private right of action against another person . . . exists only where the defendant has committed a 
legal wrong against the plaintiff and thus violated her legal right” as overbroad (quoting Benjamin 
C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 5 (1998))); 
Zipursky, supra, at 56 (“This point applies in the context of every kind of tort. Someone who uses 
another’s property without consent, absent some justification, has trespassed and invaded another’s 
legal rights in his property whether or not she ultimately compensates him.”). 
 49. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of 
Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325 (1989) (explaining how copyright law should promote 
efficient allocation of resources).  
 50. See, e.g., JULES L. COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 324–26 (1992); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, 
EQUALITY , RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE LAW 2–3 (1999). See generally Jules Coleman & Arthur 
Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91 (1995) (arguing that tort law instantiates a 
political conception of fair loss allocation). 
 51. John C.P. Goldberg, Unloved: Tort in the Modern Legal Academy, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
1501, 1515 (2002) (“Rather, it is to note that the later Coleman, armed with a deep and subtle 
appreciation of tort as a practice tied to a conception of justice, is no less anxious than the early 
Coleman to avoid embracing tort. Even as he now gingerly embraces tort, Coleman is looking past 
it, eyeing New Zealand, wondering whether we ought to be there instead.”). 
 52. Id. at 1517 (“Tort and its underlying principle of corrective justice are ours; we are stuck 
with them, and we are left to explain and understand them.”). 
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rationale be applied to copyright as well? And if not, why not? The 
question is whether copyright infringement might as well be administered 
as a social insurance system rather than by means of private causes of 
action. If copyright is to become more normatively sophisticated, it must 
take these sorts of debates to heart. Currently, copyright law does not do 
so. Instead, it presents a normatively flat world in which all policy 
questions reduce to determining the proper scope of the property right. The 
justification as to why copyright owners are given a private cause of action 
and the details of what this remedy provides are justified in terms of social 
welfare.53 By contrast, the whole point of tort is to ask a sort of normative 
question that is more subtle such that its answer does not directly implicate 
particular theories of property. To better appreciate this distinction, note 
that the debates that divide, say, corrective justice theorists from 
economists or even from one another do not typically reduce to squabbles 
regarding, for example, whether one is a Lockean property theorist or not. 
Consider next a second and perhaps more fundamental failure of 
copyright doctrine to address the level of sophistication found in tort 
generally. The failure can again be discerned most straightforwardly by 
looking at the structure of casebooks in tort, which traditionally divide up 
the subject matter according to the tripartite liability standards of 
intentional torts, negligence torts, and strict liability torts.54 Once this core 
distinction is noted, an interesting fact becomes immediately apparent, 
namely, that this tripartite liability structure does not carry over into 
copyright. As is stated, de rigeur, by courts and commentators, copyright 
infringement is a strict liability tort.55 Not only is it a strict liability tort, but 
this fact appears to be taken for granted. Tort casebooks typically seek to 
provide some sort of policy rationale for the three standards.56 By contrast, 
it is typical in copyright to simply state the fact that infringement is a strict 
liability standard, without further explanation.  
                                                                                                                     
 53. The instrumentalist justification for doing so is that the property rights will provide 
stronger protection to owners in a regime in which the owners will have a legal means to pursue 
infringers and thus hopefully deter the infringements in the first place. On an economic/utilitarian 
justificatory model, all rationales in the end are public—e.g., serving the greater good, public 
welfare, etc. See Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of 
Consistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1445–48 (1989). As 
such, on this model, a private cause of action such as granted under § 501 is viewed as allowing 
owners to function as private attorneys general. The logic of giving the enforcement right to the 
owner of the property right is based on the venerable and plausible assumption that individuals tend 
to act so as to promote their self-interest. The Walt Disney Company is most interested in Disney’s 
self-interest and thus giving Disney a private cause of action, rather than say Viacom or the 
California attorney general, is most likely to lead to the most zealous defense of Disney’s 
copyrights. 
 54. See, e.g., FRANKLIN &  RABIN , supra note 37, chs. II, VII, XII. 
 55. Educ. Testing Serv. v. Simon, 95 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1087 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (describing 
copyright infringement as a “strict liability tort”). This general rule predates the Copyright Act of 
1976. See Buck v. Jewell-LaSalle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 198 (1931) (“Intention to infringe is 
not essential under the [1909] act.”). 
 56. See, e.g., FRANKLIN &  RABIN , supra note 37, chs. II, VII, XII. 
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One might naturally assume that the reason for this is that the rationale 
for a strict liability standard is somehow obvious such that it is not in need 
of explanation or justification. Nothing could be further from the truth. 
Instead, a basic question must be addressed: why is copyright law bereft of 
liability standards that are based on negligence or intentional wrongdoing? 
Given that the fault standard is most pervasive in tort law generally, then 
other things equal, should we not expect to see the same in the domain of 
copyright infringement as well, and if not, why not? What, if anything, 
about copyright justifies the exceptional treatment? The choice of a 
liability standard is not an inconsequential point of law, but just the 
opposite. A strict liability standard strongly favors copyright owners over 
unauthorized users—or in tort terms, victims over injurers—as they may 
prevail in litigation without establishing either negligence or intentional 
wrongdoing by the defendant. Framing the issue in this light, it is 
obviously equally true that the general rule in tort favors defendants. In 
other words, there is no neutral rule; either rule favors one class of 
potential litigants over the other. At least one finds a justification for the 
latter rule in general tort doctrine.57 The salient question for present 
purposes is the divergence in treatment across legal subject matter areas. 
This divergence leads us to the discussion in Part II.B. There are different 
forms of argument one might offer with regard to determining appropriate 
liability standard or standards for copyright law. The previous discussion 
lends support for developing a form of coherence argument for extending 
fault liability to copyright.  
B.  The Emergence of the Modern Fault Standard in Tort  
Early tort law did not tease out a fault standard, per se. The earliest 
form of action was trespass, which offered a tort remedy for direct and 
forcible injuries.58 In other words, the question asked was not whether the 
injurer acted in a faulty manner but whether her action caused the injury 
directly and forcibly. The other main so-called ancient form of action was 
trespass on the case.59 Trespass on the case provided a cause of action for 
injuries less direct or forcible. Although trespass on the case was one of the 
early introductions of a fault requirement for recovery, in practice, courts 
may have presumed injurious conduct to be wrongful.60 
                                                                                                                     
 57. 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 328A, cmt. b (1965) (“[S]uch exceptional cases are 
limited, in general, to legislative enactments, or to relations in which the defendant has undertaken 
some special responsibility for the safety of the plaintiff or his property. It is not within the scope of 
this Restatement to state when such special relations may exist.”). Indeed, the rule is found in all 
U.S. jurisdictions.  
 58. See id. § 158. 
 59. See generally Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (discussing “trespass on 
the case”). 
 60. See Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on the Role of Fault in the History of the Common Law 
of Torts, 31 LA. L. REV. 1, 19–21 (1970); see also James Barr Ames, Law and Morals, 22 HARV. L. 
REV. 97, 104 (1908).  
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The negligence or fault standard replaced trespass as the dominant 
standard, however.61 While the trespass rule traces its beginnings to 
Medieval England, the fault standard itself is of more recent origin.62 This 
origin is often put in the early to mid-19th Century. Professors Anthony J. 
Sebok, Goldberg, and Zipursky trace a line of thinking from earlier cases 
that lead into leading cases such as Brown v. Kendall63 and eventually 
flowers with MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.64  
The rationales given for ushering in the fault standard have come in the 
form of moral arguments. Coleman writes, “In the received view, the 
substitution of fault for causation marked an abandonment of the immoral 
standard of strict liability under Trespass (which, after all, imposed liability 
without regard to fault) in favor of a moral foundation for tort liability 
based on the fault principle.”65 The essence of the moral argument is that it 
is unfair to hold the injurer liable for injuries that were not her fault. If she 
is not morally responsible for them, why should she be financially 
responsible?  
As stated, the previous argument is deontological in form. Law and 
economics scholars have also justified the move to the fault standard from 
an economic or utilitarian perspective.66 Posner writes, “Perhaps, then, the 
                                                                                                                     
 61. See Brown v. Collins, 53 N.H. 442, 451 (1873) (rejecting strict liability in favor of the 
negligence rule); Losee v. Buchanan 51 N.Y. 476, 488 (1873) (“No one in such case is made liable 
without some fault or negligence on his part, however serious the injury may be which he may 
accidentally cause; and there can be no reason for holding one liable for accidental injuries to 
property when he is exempt from liability for such injuries to the person.”); see also Ind. Harbor 
Belt R.R. Co. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 916 F.2d 1174, 1177 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that strict 
liability is only imposed when the high degree of risk associated with an activity cannot be 
eliminated through due care). 
 62. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 350 (3d ed. 2005) (“The old 
common law had very little to say about personal injuries caused by careless behavior. A good 
many basic doctrines of tort law first appeared before 1850; but it was in the late nineteenth century 
that this area of law (and life) experienced its biggest spurt of growth.”). 
 63. Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292, 296 (1850) (“[W]hat constitutes ordinary care 
will vary with the circumstances of cases. In general, it means that kind and degree of care, which 
prudent and cautious men would use, such as is required by the exigency of the case, and such as is 
necessary to guard against probable danger.”). 
 64. GOLDBERG, SEBOK &  ZIPURSKY, supra note 39, at 59, 760–64, 843 (analyzing the history 
of and reprinting excerpts from Kendall and MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 
1916)). 
 65. Jules L. Coleman, Moral Theories of Torts: Their Scope and Limits (pt. 1), 1 L. & Phil. 
371, 374 (1982). 
 66. In normative legal scholarship, an economic approach is sometimes contrasted with a 
“moral” approach. See, e.g., Jody S. Kraus, Transparency and Determinacy in Common Law 
Adjudication: A Philosophical Defense of Explanatory Economic Analysis, 93 VA. L. REV. 287, 
292–93 (2007). On a more sophisticated approach, however, an economic approach is not viewed 
as an alternative to a moral explanation but instead as an alternative moral explanation, in 
particular, a consequentialist one that is grounded in either utilitarianism or some variant, such as 
wealth maximization. See Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 33–34 
(1972); Kenneth W. Simons, The Hand Formula in the Draft Restatement (Third) of Torts: 
Encompassing Fairness as Well as Efficiency Values, 54 VAND. L. REV. 901, 908 (2001). 
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dominant function of the fault system is to generate rules of liability that if 
followed will bring about, at least approximately, the efficient—the cost-
justified—level of accidents and safety.”67 Posner makes this claim not 
merely in an abstract normative sense. Famously, he argues that the best 
explanation of tort law doctrine is attributable to its welfare-promoting 
characteristics.68 Thus, we see that both teleologists and deontologists 
argue that the path of the law has been from strict liability to fault liability 
for reasons that are compelling from each of the two dominant normative 
perspectives: deontology and utilitarianism.  
My present concern is not whether these are convincing arguments from 
a top-down normative perspective. For present purposes, what matters is 
that the fault standard won out in the case law. This doctrinal development 
is of interest because it raises the obvious question: if a heightened moral 
sensitivity toward fairness and social welfare dictated a move to the fault 
standard in tort generally, then why not in copyright as well? Is it that the 
same moral arguments do not apply for some reason, or is there some other 
explanation?  
To answer these questions, the place to begin is with the orthodox 
rationales that have been provided for a strict liability rule in copyright. 
Leading hornbook author Marshall Leaffer argues, “The customary 
explanation for excluding innocence as a defense to copyright infringement 
is that, as between the copyright owner and the infringer, the infringer is 
better placed to avoid the error.”69 This justification is inadequate from the 
                                                                                                                     
 67. Posner, supra note 66, at 33. Other economists argue that strict liability causes actors to 
take too much precaution and for potential creators to take too little precaution against being 
injured. In effect, strict liability turns injurers into insurers of victims’ losses and creates a moral 
hazard as potential victims are not incentivized to take due care to avoid being injured.See Joseph 
H. King, Jr., A Goals-Oriented Approach to Strict Tort Liability for Abnormally Dangerous 
Activities, 48 BAYLOR L. REV. 341, 349–61 (1996). It should be noted that there have been 
defenders of the morality of strict liability. The best known example is Richard Epstein. See 
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 40 (1985). 
 68. Posner, supra note 66, at 32–33. 
 69. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 476 (3d ed. 1999); see ABKCO 
Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 999 (2d Cir. 1983) (“[A]s a practical matter, 
the problems of proof inherent in a rule that would permit innocent intent as a defense to copyright 
infringement could substantially undermine the protections Congress intended to afford to copyright 
holders.”); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY  8–9 (1994) (“An author’s right to ward off 
unauthorized copying of his work is much like a homeowner’s right to keep trespassers off his 
land.”); 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &  DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.08 (rev. ed. 2010) 
(“Innocent intent should no more constitute a defense in an infringement action than in the case of 
conversion of tangible personalty. In each case, the injury to a property interest is worthy of redress, 
regardless of the innocence of the defendant.”). This claim begs the question because Congress did 
not intend a certain level of protection, per se, but instead the level of protection that serves to 
promote the larger goals of copyright—promotion of the arts and sciences. The obvious problem 
with this claim is that it also begs the question as to why conversion is an apt analogy in the first 
place. Conversion is an intentional tort and thus to the extent that some infringements are best 
characterized as accidental, the analogy fails. 2 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, GOLDSTEIN ON COPYRIGHT § 8.1, 
at n.1 (3d ed. 2005) (“This rule is dictated by the more general rule that innocence is no defense to 
an action for copyright infringement.”); David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. 
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perspective of modern tort law, however. To see this, consider a common 
type of tort fact pattern: inadvertently hitting a pedestrian while driving an 
automobile. Now, imagine two different ways in which this might happen. 
In the first, the victim runs out into the street and the driver is unable to 
stop in time despite the fact that she is not driving too fast for conditions 
and is paying attention to the road. In the second, the driver hits the 
pedestrian because the driver is not paying attention to her driving but is 
instead text messaging for some casual, non-emergency reason. In both 
cases, it is indeed true that the driver is in the better position to avoid the 
injury for the simple reason that she could alternatively have stopped her 
car in time to avoid the collision. To invoke a venerable tort doctrine, the 
driver had the “last clear chance” to avert the injurious collision.70  
What distinguishes these two scenarios is that in the former, the driver 
is without fault, both morally and by the lights of tort law; while in the 
second scenario, the driver has both committed a moral wrong and will be 
found legally liable due to her negligent behavior that led to the accident. It 
is clearly negligent behavior for a driver to hit a pedestrian for no better 
reason than that she was distracted from the road due to text messaging. 
The distinction at issue in abstract tort terms is that between faulty versus 
non-faulty, accidental injuries to others.  
What is surprising is that this defining distinction of tort law is simply 
absent from copyright law despite the fact that copyright infringement is 
agreed by all to be a tort. Once one bears this distinction in mind, the 
question for Leaffer’s rationale for strict liability in copyright is the 
following: why should the mere fact that the infringer is better placed to 
avoid the injury be sufficient for liability?71 Shouldn’t it matter whether the 
injurer was acting in a faulty manner in causing the injury? It does in 
regular tort; why not in copytort? We see then that arguing from first 
principles ensconced in modern tort doctrine, we are led to the conclusion 
that the liability standard for copyright infringement should incorporate a 
fault standard, as it is conventionally thought to be immoral to make 
someone liable for injuries that occurred through no fault of her own. A 
copyright-centric rationale such as Leaffer’s simply fails to address the 
fault issue.  
In copyright, the distinction is papered over with the notion of 
“innocent infringement,” which is contrasted with “intentional 
infringement.”72 In this manner, copyright doctrine is seeking to manage 
                                                                                                                     
REV. 139, 180 (2009) (“[N]otice does little for authors save for negating an innocent infringement 
defense, which does not provide a full defense to infringement but rather serves only to mitigate 
statutory damages.”). 
 70. “Last clear chance” refers to the doctrine that a plaintiff who committed contributory acts 
of negligence may nonetheless recover damages against a defendant who had the last opportunity in 
time to avoid the damage. See 2 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 479–80 (1965). 
 71. LEAFFER, UNDERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 69, at 476. 
 72. Compare Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 180–81 
(S.D.N.Y. 1976) (finding former Beatle George Harrison to be an innocent infringer when he 
unintentionally and unconsciously copied the tune of another song), a d N. Music Corp. v. 
Pacemaker Music Co., No. 64 Civ. 1956, 1965 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6864, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 5, 
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with two piles in which to lump injuries for which redress may be owed, 
instead of three. It would be as if tort law attempted to manage with only 
intentional torts and unintentional, that is, innocent torts. This will not do 
in modern tort law, which, once the intentional injuries are set aside, insists 
upon asking of the unintentional ones, that is, the accidental ones, whether 
the accident was the result of faulty or negligent behavior on the part of the 
injurer. What is missing in copyright law is a notion of accidental 
infringement, per se—an infringement that is not intentional yet which 
must still be evaluated for fault.  
C.  Abnormally Dangerous Activities  
It is at this juncture in the overall argument that remix, and in particular 
amateur remix, merits reentry into the discussion. I will argue below that it 
is in the context of amateur remix that it is most fitting to characterize 
infringements as accidental. Before progressing to this discussion, 
however, there is yet more groundwork to be laid. The findings of the 
above discussion are so startling as to demand a second look before 
moving on. The best means of doing this is by raising the following 
possibilities. Within traditional tort law, exceptions to the fault rule have 
long been recognized. Thus, we must look at these in order to determine 
whether a parallel rationale might be at work for copyright infringement. 
The paradigmatic types of fact pattern in tort that have merited exceptional 
treatment are injuries caused by dangerous activities such as using or 
keeping explosives or wild animals, on the one hand, and trespass to land, 
on the other hand.73 The First Restatement of Torts utilized the category of 
“ultrahazardous” activities while the Second Restatement of Torts refers to 
“abnormally dangerous” activities.74 Looking at the law regarding these 
sorts of activities will give us a better understanding as to whether 
copyright infringement may be plausibly understood to fall within the 
ambit of the strict liability exception as it is found in tort law.  
Under the First Restatement, if one injured another while engaging in 
an ultrahazardous activity, one’s actions would be held to a strict liability 
standard.75 Under the Second Restatement, as noted above, the wording 
                                                                                                                     
1965) (“[I]f copying did in fact occur; it cannot be defended on the ground that it was done 
unconsciously and without intent to appropriate plaintiff’s work.”), with Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 
Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd. 545 U.S. 913, 941 (2005) (reversing summary judgment and 
remanding for further proceedings on whether defendants were liable for intentionally inducing 
infringement). 
 73. Compare Exner v. Sherman Power Constr. Co., 54 F.2d 510, 514 (2d Cir. 1931) 
(applying strict liability where explosives were held in quantity in a dangerous place), and Mills v. 
Smith, 673 P.2d 117, 120 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983) (affirming strict liability on defendant owners for 
injuries suffered by a minor inflicted by a lion), with United States v. Osterlund, 671 F.2d 1267, 
1267–68 (10th Cir. 1982) (applying trespass liability where defendant’s residence encroached on 
land owned by plaintiff). 
 74. Compare 3 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520 (1938), with 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS § 520 (1977). 
 75. 3 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 520 (1938) (“An activity is ultrahazarous if it (a) 
necessarily involves a risk of serious harm to the person, land or chattels of others which cannot be 
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was changed to the test for “abnormally dangerous” activities.76 That 
Restatement calls for courts to apply a multi-factor test, which includes the 
following factors: 
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the 
person, land or chattels of others; (b) likelihood that the harm 
that results from it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate the 
risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which the 
activity is not a matter of common usage; (e) 
inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is 
carried on; and (f) extent to which its value to the community 
is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.77  
Courts and commentators have generally agreed that there is no magic 
number of these elements that must be satisfied.78 
Consider how these factors would apply to amateur digital content. The 
first factor requires a “high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land 
or chattels of others.” This factor contains two operative parts: first, the 
high degree of risk of some harm; second, the person, land, or chattels of 
others. The first part will often be satisfied in infringement cases as the 
factor merely calls for some harm, as the focus is on the degree of risk, not 
the degree of severity of the harm. Amateurs as unauthorized users of 
copyrighted content may indeed sometimes cause harm. For instance, a 
pornographic remix of a Harry Potter movie may taint the characters if the 
remix is disseminated to the public and widely viewed. As to whether there 
is a “high degree of risk,” while this phrase is left undefined, it certainly 
seems possible in some instances. Using the same example, there would 
appear to be a high degree of risk of at least some harm from a 
pornographic remix of a Harry Potter movie. The key point, however, is 
that this would be judged on a case-by-case basis, and it appears that the 
vast run of amateur remix would cause no harm. A different story might 
pertain to commercial remix, but it is Lessig’s goal to assimilate the 
arguments for commercial and amateur remix—not mine.79  
                                                                                                                     
eliminated by the exercise of the utmost care, and (b) is not a matter of common usage.”).  
 76. 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977). 
 77. Id. 
 78. See Klein v. Pyrodyne Corp., 810 P.2d 917, 920 (Wash. 1991), amended by 817 P.2d 
1359 (Wash. 1991); see also 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977) (“In 
determining whether the danger is abnormal, the factors listed in Clauses (a) to (f) of this Section 
are all to be considered, and are all of importance. Any one of them is not necessarily sufficient of 
itself in a particular case, and ordinarily several of them will be required for strict liability. On the 
other hand, it is not necessary that each of them be present, especially if others weigh heavily.”). 
 79. Lessig downplays the distinction between commercial and non-commercial uses. LESSIG, 
supra note 5, at 55. Lessig compares jazz musicians of old and their tolerated practice of 
improvising on works of others and asks rhetorically why the same should hold for the 
contemporary parallel, music mash-ups: “Why should it be effectively impossible for an artist from 
Harlem practicing the form of art of the age to commercialize his creativity because the costs of 
negotiating and clearing the rights here are so incredibly high?” Id. at 105. His response, “The 
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A good bit of evidence as to how the U.S. Copyright Office views harm 
can be seen in its Report on Orphan Works and legislative proposal.80 
While this document has not passed into law, it is highly significant 
because the document acknowledges that it would often be the case that 
there would be no damages, even were the owner of the orphan work to 
surface.81 Given that everyday Internet users are capable of grabbing 
content from a seemingly unlimited variety of sources of online content, 
there is likely to be a good deal of usage of orphan works in amateur 
remix. Sometimes the ownership of this work will be evident, as is 
especially true for mainstream commercial culture such as film, music, and 
books. But often as well, content will be found from sources that provide 
no ownership information. Thus, these sorts of remix will be comprised of 
de facto orphan works, and judging from what the U.S. Copyright Office 
has stated, “reasonable damages” will often be little or nothing.82 In the 
Report, the U.S. Copyright Office goes so far as to provide a special note 
concerning non-commercial works.83 
The second factor is the “likelihood that the harm that results from it 
will be great.” The Restatement does not define “great,” but the sorts of 
harms the Restatement considers as paradigmatic examples include being 
injured by dynamite.84 As just noted, typically there will be no harm. So, 
moreover, there will typically not be great harm. But unlike Lessig, I 
acknowledge that great harm is possible, say, if a slightly altered copy of a 
newly released movie were made available online. 
The third factor considers the “inability to eliminate the risk by the 
exercise of reasonable care.” One response to this factor is that it shows the 
inapplicability of the whole framework to copyright infringement, which, 
one might argue, is by its nature akin to an intentional tort, such that it 
makes no sense to talk about eliminating risk. One might argue, for 
example, that when the DJ who goes by the name Girl Talk copies a song 
in order to use it in a mash-up, it makes no sense to ask whether he could 
have eliminated the risk through reasonable care. The unauthorized copy 
was not the accidental by-product of some other action like accidentally 
hitting a pedestrian while driving. Rather, it was his intention to make the 
unauthorized copy.  
                                                                                                                     
answer is: for no good reason, save inertia and the forces that like the world frozen as it is.” Id. In 
other words, these remix artists should be able to “commercialize” their “creativity.” Id. The 
following remark is further evidence that Lessig seeks to legalize commercial remix as well: “There 
should be a broad swath of freedom for professionals to remix existing copyrighted work . . . .” Id
at 255. 
 80. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, REPORT ON ORPHAN WORKS: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF 
COPYRIGHTS (2006). 
 81. Id. at 86–87, 115–19. 
 82. See id. at 49–50. 
 83. Id. at 82. 
 84. See Catholic Welfare Guild, Inc. v. Brodney Corp., 208 A.2d 301, 301, 303–04 (Del. 
Super. Ct. 1964) (applying strict liability to defendant where plaintiff’s property was damaged from 
defendant’s explosive blasting across the street).  
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Based on the above discussion, there is a plausible rejoinder to this 
argument, which is that it is often most accurate to see unauthorized 
copying of a third party’s work as accidental in nature.85 For instance, this 
would seem like the most felicitous manner to view instances of so-called 
“innocent infringement.”86 The preeminent case involving innocent 
infringement is ABKCO Music, Ltd. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd.87 The court 
was clear that it did not think the defendant intended to make an infringing 
copy. The court noted that this was an instance of “subconscious 
copying.”88 Commentators have focused on the element of defendant’s 
knowledge when discussing this case.89 Note, however, that it is 
meaningful to ask whether there was an inability to eliminate the risk by 
the exercise of reasonable care. Indeed, it would appear the defendant 
might well have avoided the risk. It is not that the unconscious copying 
was of an obscure song. Rather, it was a hit song by well-known artists 
who would have been recognized by many people with exposure to the 
work, particularly so, one would think, for people in the music business.  
The duty that negligence law sets is for actors to take due care to avoid 
causing harm to others. Thus, one might copy without authorization and 
yet take reasonable care to avoid the risk of harm. This is arguably an apt 
description of the norm in the fan fiction community, which has been an 
early and venerable source of amateur-generated content.90 The norm 
proscribes commercialization of fan works.91 One reason to do so is to 
avoid the potential to cause market harm to the owner’s work. In 
negligence terms, this can be characterized as an attempt to exercise due 
care to avoid harm through infringement.92  
                                                                                                                     
 85. Tort law distinguishes between accidental and intentionally harmful activities. For 
instance, in Cole v. Hibberd, No. CA94-01-015, 1994 WL 424103, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 12 Dist. 
Aug. 15, 1994), the court noted that the plaintiff could not choose which cause of action it 
preferred, that there was a fact of the matter as to whether the injury was caused intentionally or 
accidentally. Behavior online and in virtual worlds, for example, is bringing about more accidental 
infringements. Amateur machinima is a good example of an emerging behavior, much of which is 
plausibly fair use, with the implication that, that which is not may be accidental infringement. Alex 
Pham, Straight from Video, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 11, 2005, http://articles.latimes.com/2005/oct/11/b 
usiness/fi-machinima11 (describing the machinima technique of creating movies using the digital 
characters from video games as controlled by their gamers turned directors). 
 86. See ABKCO Music, Inc. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 722 F.2d 988, 998–99 & n.12 (2d 
Cir. 1983). 
 87.  Id.  
88.  Id. at 997 (affirming the trial court’s conclusion “that the substantial similarity coupled 
with access constituted copyright infringement, even though subconsciously accomplished”). 
 89. Russ VerSteeg, Intent, Originality, Creativity and Joint Authorship, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 
123, 133 (2002). 
 90. JENKINS, supra note 1 at 162–77. 
 91. See Casey Fiesler, Note, Everything I Need to Know I Learned from Fandom: How 
Existing Social Norms Can Help Shape the Next Generation of User-Generated Content, 10 VAND. 
J. ENT. &  TECH. L. 729, 752 (2008) (noting two situations in fandom where attribution is considered 
important). 
 92. Note that it does not matter if defendant consciously sought to exercise due care—as was 
famously argued by Holmes long ago, negligence is an objective standard. O.W. H LMES, JR., THE 
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There may, however, be situations in which there is an inability to 
eliminate the risk of harm. For example, in the case of Harper & Row, 
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, it was arguably substantially certain 
that by publishing the work from former President Gerald Ford’s book in 
its magazine that The Nation would injure Ford in light of the specific 
agreement between Ford and Time that Time would not publish the work if 
it appeared elsewhere first.93 While the editor of The Nation would not 
have been privy to this agreement, as a magazine editor, it is likely fair to 
say that he was “substantially certain” that this particular sort of harm 
would result.94  
Contrasting the above two sorts of fact patterns demonstrates why the 
dichotomy of intentional infringement versus innocent infringement 
offered in copyright doctrine is not sufficiently fine-grained. The category 
of intentionally wrongful activity adequately captures the defendant’s 
actions in Harper & Row, but clearly, it is inadequate to characterize the 
copying that occurred in Harrisongs as simply innocent. It is innocent if by 
this we mean simply that there was not a substantial certainty of injury and 
thus no intentional tort. But if the term “innocent” is used this broadly, 
then the driver who accidentally runs down the pedestrian while text 
messaging is innocent as well, inasmuch as her injurious act was not 
intentional.   
The fourth factor considers the “extent to which the activity is not a 
matter of common usage.” How this factor applies would depend on the 
details of the unauthorized copying. In Harper & Row, for example, the 
editor of The Nation had the explicit goal of “scooping” Time magazine on 
the juiciest bits of Ford’s autobiography, namely, those facts surrounding 
Ford’s presidential pardon of Richard Nixon.95 This is a very different type 
of activity from, say, the sorts of activities lauded by Professor Henry 
Jenkins of teenagers writing fan fiction based on well-known characters.96 
This sort of activity is very common while the behavior engaged in by The 
Nation is not. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that these sorts of 
                                                                                                                     
COMMON LAW 112–13 (1881). 
 93. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 567 (1985) (“Time’s 
cancellation of its projected serialization and its refusal to pay the $12,500 were the direct effect of 
the infringement. . . . Rarely will a case of copyright infringement present such clear-cut evidence of 
actual damage.”). The Second Circuit certainly treated the harm as direct and imminent. Id. at 545. 
 94. As discussed below, there are two means to satisfy the intentionality requirement for an 
intentional tort. One can explicitly intend some outcome, such as that one’s hand comes into 
forcible contact with another’s nose, or second, one can intend some other outcome, but yet the 
injurious, tortious outcome is “substantially certain” to result. 4 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 
§ 825 (1979). 
 95. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 542–43. To get a sense of the powerful thrust of amateur-
generated content, one need only go online and search about for the quickly growing body of 
amateur works that draw from the Twilight book and film series. See, e.g., Lipton, supra note 13 
(analyzing four case studies relating to the Twilight franchise). 
 96. JENKINS, supra note 3, at 131 (“Fans are the most active segment of the media audience, 
one that refuses to simply accept what they are given, but rather insists on the right to become full 
participants.”). 
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amateur creative activities will continue to become more common as a 
function of technical advances. Thus, technological advance creates a 
secular trend against such activities being subject to a strict liability 
standard by the lights of general tort doctrine, inasmuch as it creates a 
secular trend toward their production, such that they increasingly become a 
matter of “common usage.”97  
In light of this factor, consider a venerable explanation for strict liability 
doctrine developed by Professor George Fletcher in his famous article, 
Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory.98 He first notes that the notion of 
ultrahazardous or unreasonably dangerous activities cannot be the core 
explanation of strict liability as tort law applies a fault rule for injuries that 
result from driving automobiles despite the fact that this is clearly a 
dangerous activity.99 Fletcher’s explanation for when tort law applies a 
strict liability rule relies on the purported non-reciprocal nature of the risks 
created in certain types of activities, such as blasting. The more common 
an activity becomes, the more likely it is that a larger degree of reciprocity 
of risk comes about in which the same social groups both create risks for 
others due to their engaging in the activity and are themselves subjected to 
the same sort of risks due to engaging in the activity.100 In this light, we 
can view the so-called “democratization” of content creation, which is 
commonly viewed as a hallmark of Web 2.0. Because the creation of 
amateur digital content is an increasingly pervasive activity, on the basis of 
Fletcher’s reciprocity argument, one would predict that the risks produced 
by creators would become increasingly reciprocal, and thus, there would be 
ever less reason to apply a strict liability standard. 
The fifth factor considers the “inappropriateness of the activity to the 
place where it is carried on.” Once again, this factor would appear to vary 
depending on the type of unauthorized copying. Consider a website such as 
the one run by Heather Lawver, a teenager who maintained a website for 
children to post fan fiction about Harry Potter.101 A particular posting to 
this site surely could not be characterized as inappropriate to the place 
where it was carried on given that the very purpose of the site was to serve 
as a venue for such works. Indeed, this factor highlights one of the aspects 
that makes cyberspace so pregnant with possibility—that new places can 
be created for new forms of activity such that, almost as a matter of 
definition, the sort of activity at issue is appropriate to the place.102 
                                                                                                                     
 97. As noted earlier, it is increasingly common to make references such as 
“creator/consumer.” See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 98. George P. Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1972).  
 99. Id. at 543–44. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Heather L. Lawver, The Daily Prophet Needs Your Help!, http://www.dprophet.com 
(last visited Oct. 1, 2010). 
 102. But see CLAY SHIRKY , HERE COMES EVERYBODY: THE POWER OF ORGANIZING WITHOUT 
ORGANIZATIONS 196–202 (2008) (discussing the website meetup.com, which allows users to set up 
affinity groups of their own choosing). While the meetup.com website was okay with groups for 
witches and stay-at-home moms, another website made the decision to censor a group for anorexia. 
Id. at 197, 200, 203–05. 
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Finally, the sixth factor looks to the “extent to which its value to the 
community is outweighed by its dangerous attributes.” For example, as 
already noted, Jenkins and others have argued persuasively that amateur 
remix may have great positive social value.103 Professor Rebecca Tushnet 
argues that it has social value due to the fact that its non-commercial nature 
means that types of works that would otherwise not be created are 
created.104 The importance of Tushnet’s point is that it implicitly resists at 
least one reading of the Bleistein non-discrimination principle, which can 
be read to say that the copyrightability of a work should not discriminate 
against some forms of content as compared to others. Tushnet is doing 
precisely this and, in the present writer’s opinion, properly so. Her claim, 
in effect, is not just that more creative content will be produced but that 
content of a new and different sort will be produced.105 Surely, it is a better 
reading of the constitutional dictate to promote the arts and sciences that 
this builds in some notion of diversity and quality of content as well as 
simply a quantitative notion of incentivizing more content creation. 
 On the other hand, once we open the Pandora’s box of judging the 
quality or social value of content, we must be open to the prospect of 
socially harmful content as well. For instance, Professor Ann Bartow has 
plausibly argued that amateur-generated pornography has a negative social 
value and should be recognized as such.106  
What are we to conclude, then, from this application of the Second 
Restatement’s § 520 multi-factor test for copyright infringement? As 
illustrated, there is not one typical sort of situation. In general, however, 
amateur-generated content does not fit the overall profile for strict liability 
torts based on the § 520 test. We cannot allow the intricacies of the multi-
factor test to be the trees through which we lose the forest of the basic 
sense of the test, which is to apply the strict liability standard to the sorts of 
activities that are inherently dangerous in the sense that there is a real risk 
of significant harm and that this risk cannot be dampened through 
precaution.107 As I will argue in the next Part, it is typically not the case 
                                                                                                                     
 103. JENKINS, supra note 1, at 278–80. 
 104. See Tushnet, supra note 6, 521 n.20. There is a line of thought in copyright policy that 
courts should not engage in the qualitative analysis of particular works. This is generally described 
as the Bleistein Doctrine. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251–52 
(1903); see also Miriam Bitton, Trends in Protection for Informational Works Under Copyright 
Law During the 19th and 20th Centuries, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. &  TECH. L. REV. 115, 131 n.75 
(2006). The application of factor (f)—the sixth factor—begs the question as to whether the Bl istein 
Doctrine is tenable, at least in this context. 
 105. Tushnet, supra note 6, at 526–36. 
 106. Ann Bartow, Pornography, Coercion, and Copyright Law 2.0, 1  VAND. J. ENT. &  TECH. 
L. 799, 812–16 (2008). 
 107. See Luthringer v. Moore, 190 P.2d 1, 5–6 (Cal. 1948) (holding that the question of 
whether a case is a proper one for imposing strict liability is one of law for the court to decide and 
applying the strict liability standard to an activity it deemed ultrahazardous); see also 3 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 cmt. f (1977) (“The essential question is whether the risk 
created is so unusual, either because of its magnitude or because of the circumstances surrounding 
it, as to justify the imposition of strict liability for the harm that results from it, even though it is 
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that there is a real risk of significant harm that cannot be reduced through 
the exercise of due care and so a vast amount of amateur digital content 
would be excluded from consideration for a strict liability rule on these 
grounds. Regarding the issue of whether the risk can be dampened through 
greater precaution, whether this factor is even applicable will depend on 
the manner in which the amateur digital content was created. As noted 
above, this factor is inapplicable when the unauthorized copying is 
intentional, but  not all unauthorized copying is most aptly characterized as 
intentional. While the question of due care is, in general, alien to copyright 
discourse, for the reasons discussed above, this lacunae is unwarranted and 
in need of amendment in an approach to copyright that takes tort—
particularly accidental infringement—seriously, especially in a world of 
exploding amateur digital content in which authors increasingly create risk 
of harm to others but there is not an intention to harm. 
D.  Copytrespass 
As mentioned above, the second venerable type of behavior that 
receives a strict liability standard in traditional tort is trespass to land.108 In 
copyright cases and commentary, the analogy is sometimes drawn between 
trespass to land and copyright infringement. However, what are we to 
make of this comparison? Typically, when this comparison is brought up, 
it is in what I would characterize as a conclusory legal fashion, i.e., the 
comparison is drawn because both sorts of behavior have a strict liability 
standard attached to them. This fact, qua positive legal fact, is 
uncontroversial. The harder question is whether these sorts of activities are 
similar in some intrinsic way that would explain the fact that they each 
share the exceptional liability standard. Strict liability for land trespass 
would not justify strict liability in copyright given that one might as well 
point to the fact of fault liability for trespass to chattel as a justification of 
fault liability in copyright.109 In other words, even assuming that trespass is 
an apt analogy, why think trespass to land is more apt than trespass to 
chattel? 
The obvious first question to ask is what is the justification for the strict 
liability rule in real property law? The rule has been justified as in keeping 
                                                                                                                     
carried on with all reasonable care. In other words, are its dangers and inappropriateness for the 
locality so great that, despite any usefulness it may have for the community, it should be required as 
a matter of law to pay for any harm it causes, without the need of a finding of negligence.”). 
 108. See 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965) (discussing the elements of 
trespass); see also id. § 166 (“Except where the actor is engaged in an abnormally dangerous 
activity, an unintentional and non-negligent entry on land in the possession of another, or causing a 
thing or third person to enter the land, does not subject the actor to liability to the possessor, even 
though the entry causes harm to the possessor or to a thing or third person in whose security the 
possessor has a legally protected interest.”); 1 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 7 cmt. a (1934) 
(discussing the distinction between “injury” and “harm,” shedding light on the types of harm 
envisioned by tort law to be recompensable). 
 109. See Thrifty-Tel, Inc. v. Bezenek, 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468, 472–73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); see 
also Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Horn Tower Constr. Co., 363 P.2d 175, 178 (Colo. 1961) 
(“[F]ault of the actor is an essential ingredient of liability [for trespass to chattels].”). 
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with a special solicitude for the home in the common law in keeping with 
other doctrines such as the special solicitude as seen in the Fourth 
Amendment.110 The rule does have long roots in the common law. Indeed, 
as noted above, the ancient cause of action in tort generally was trespass, in 
which the liability was strict (so long as the injurious action was direct and 
forcible). In this sense, the strict liability rule for real property trespassers 
can be viewed as a remnant of a past in which this was the general rule. 
Courts sometimes provoke the venerable notion that a person’s home is her 
castle.111 The norm intended to be captured in this phrase is that the home 
deserves special protection. Strict liability provides such protection as it 
favors owners over trespassers. 
Other courts have cast land trespass as a sort of dignitary harm. A 
leading case is Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., in which defendant 
moved a mobile home across the plaintiff’s property.112 Likely due to the 
fact that it was winter in Wisconsin and snow covered the ground, the jury 
found no compensatory harm to the plaintiff’s property. The court 
nevertheless found harm, noting that,  
The action for intentional trespass is directed at 
vindication of the legal right. . . . The law recognizes actual 
harm in every trespass to land whether or not compensatory 
damages are awarded. Thus, in the case of intentional trespass 
to land, the nominal damage award represents the recognition 
that, although immeasurable in mere dollars, actual harm has 
occurred.  
. . . . 
. . . Society has an interest in punishing and deterring 
intentional trespassers beyond that of protecting the interests 
of the individual landowner. Society has an interest in 
preserving the integrity of the legal system. Private 
landowners should feel confident that wrongdoers who 
trespass upon their land will be appropriately punished.113  
The court’s opinion can be read as discerning what is, in effect, 
dignitary harm. The notion of dignitary harm is a promising parallel to 
copyright, inasmuch as a harm to intangible property is also not a physical 
harm, for the obvious reason that one cannot do physical harm to that 
which has no physical existence. There is a problem with drawing this 
                                                                                                                     
 110. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 111. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 53 So. 2d 340, 346 (Ala. 1951); see also State v. Thomas, 673 
N.E.2d 1339, 1342 (Ohio 1997) (“However, there is no duty to retreat when one is assaulted in 
one’s own home. . . . This exception to the duty to retreat derives from the doctrine that one’s home 
is one’s castle and one has a right to protect it and those within it from intrusion or attack.”).  
 112. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Wis. 1997).  
 113. Id. at 160. 
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parallel, however. At least in the United States, copyright is widely viewed 
as grounded in economic reasoning, which by its nature denies granting sui 
generis normative status to non-instrumentalist notions such as dignity. 
Dignitary harm on an economic conception is dignitary harm in scare 
quotes. On an economic um consequentialist approach, the legal 
recognition of such harms begins and ends with their analysis as 
constructed and justified solely in terms of their instrumental role in the 
promotion of utility, welfare, or wealth. Dignity has no independent 
normative weight in an economic or utilitarian model. 
A variety of non-instrumentalist normative approaches may recognize 
dignitary harms as real and worthy of independent normative recognition 
and protection. In terms of an actual legal regime that might recognize such 
harms as deontological primitives, the obvious suggestion is a moral rights 
approach to copyright. Indeed, in an ordinary language sense of the word 
“dignity,” it seems transparent that moral rights are dignitary rights. This 
notwithstanding, from the perspective of the U.S. copyright system, there 
are no dignitary rights, per se.114 This has the important implication that if 
copyright is to justify a strict liability rule by analogy to trespass to land 
and its correlative dignitary harms, the justification must be in instrumental 
terms. In other words, one must provide a plausible account of how it 
optimizes the instrumental goals of copyright to have strict liability and 
conceive of the harm as dignitary harm.115  
                                                                                                                     
 114. See Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos, Inc., 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (“American 
copyright law, as presently written, does not recognize moral rights or provide a cause of action for 
their violation, since the law seeks to vindicate the economic, rather than the personal, rights of 
authors.”). But see Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 291 (1970) (“The [copyright] system 
provides a fairly useful way to protect an author’s dignitary rights . . . .”). Many nations recognize 
moral rights as they are signatories to the Berne Convention. Berne Convention for the Protection 
of Literary and Artistic Works art. 2(1), Sept. 9, 1886, revised at Paris July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 
1341, 828 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter Berne Convention], available at http://www.law.cornell.ed 
u/treaties/berne/overview.html. Article Six protects attribution and integrity, stating: 
Independently of the author’s economic rights, and even after the transfer of the 
said rights, the author shall have the right to claim authorship of the work and to 
object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of, or other derogatory 
action in relation to, the said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or 
reputation. 
Id. 
However, moral rights regimes have had more success in other nations as the United States has 
really only embraced them with respect to visual art. See generally Berne Convention 
Implementation Act of 1988, § 3(b)(1), Pub. L. No. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2853 (codified as amended 
at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006)); Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, § 603(a), Pub. L. No. 101-650, 104 
Stat. 5128 (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 106A (2006)) (providing special attribution integrity rights only 
to creators of visual art). “Only the author of a work of visual art has the rights conferred by 
subsection (a) in that work, whether or not the author is the copyright owner.” 17 U.S.C. § 106A(b) 
(2006). But see Gilliam, 538 F.2d at 26 (enjoining ABC television network from editing the Monty 
Python television program). 
 115. It is a staple of utilitarian theory, after all, that just because one is a utilitarian (or other 
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At the level of ordinary language, it is worth asking whether copyright 
infringement seems intuitively connected with dignitary harm. As a point 
of reference, note that when moral rights violations are discussed, the 
factual contexts are typically ones in which the infringing acts are quite 
intentional,116 and second, that when it comes to the world of amateur 
digital content, it is inapt in many situations to conceive of the infringing 
acts as an intentional affront to dignity. Importantly, there is a connection 
between being intentional and being an affront to dignity, by the lights of 
established deontological approaches.117 It is obvious to ordinary morality 
generally to view an intentional harm to another as morally worse than an 
accidental harm, all else equal. The obvious implication for copyright, 
then, is that whether a particular act of infringement is an affront to dignity 
or not will vary depending on the degree of intentionality in the infringing 
act.  
As noted earlier, formal copyright doctrine does recognize the notion of 
“intentional infringement,” although the factor goes to the question of 
remedy, not liability itself. The question is raised, then, in what sense are 
non-intentional infringements properly seen as affronts to dignity? Indeed, 
even in the case of many amateur digital creations that may be said to 
involve intentional infringement, it is contrary to ordinary moral intuition, 
and seemingly purely formalistic, to conceive of the acts as affronts to 
dignity. Perhaps the best examples again are those of the sort lauded by 
Jenkins: Heather Lawver’s use of Harry Potter, for instance, is driven by 
love and admiration of the works of its creator J.K. Rowling; surely, there 
is no violation of the author’s dignity in any ordinary language sense of 
that term.118 Thus, this consideration offers no support for drawing a 
                                                                                                                     
consequentialist) one can still engage in talk of seemingly non-utilitarian, normative concepts so 
long as one does not forget the so-called “rule utilitarian” justification for doing so. After all, the 
fount of modern utilitarianism—John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty—does precisely this for the 
deontological primitive of liberty. 
116. See 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(3) (2006). The rights of certain authors to attribution and 
integrity are subject to § 113(d) limitations. Visual artists have the right  
(A) to prevent any intentional distortion, mutilation, or other modification of that 
work which would be prejudicial to his or her honor or reputation, and any 
intentional distortion, mutilation, or modification of that work is a violation of that 
right, and (B) to prevent any destruction of a work of recognized stature, and any 
intentional or grossly negligent destruction of that work is a violation of that right  
Id.; see also Mass. Museum of Contemporary Art Found. v. Buchel, 593 F.3d 38, 41–42 (1st Cir. 
2010) (finding in favor of an artist who successfully stipulated claim for violation of his moral right 
of integrity when museum displayed his unfinished work). 
 117. See 3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &  DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 8D.06[C][1] 
(rev. ed. 2010) (noting that “an intentional and prejudicial mutilation is an integrity violation, 
remediable through not only an injunction, but damages as well”). 
 118. JENKINS, supra note 3, at 171–74. Heather Lawver has created a medium where readers of 
Harry Potter can immerse themselves in the material “to escape from or reaffirm aspects of their 
real lives.” Id. at 174. 
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parallel with trespass to land even supposing that trespass to land is most 
accurately viewed as a strict liability rule based on dignitary harm.  
In the above discussion, we first saw that in general there has been a 
historical shift from strict liability to fault liability and that there is no 
prima facie reason that this should not apply to copyright infringement as 
well. Next, we looked at the exceptions to the general fault rule in tort—
ultrahazardous activities and land trespass. We saw that the rationale for 
those exceptions does not apply to copyright infringement.  
As a final consideration, it is worth asking whether there is some sui 
generis reason for strict liability in copyright. Consider the general law and 
economic justification for strict liability: When one activity is so 
undesirable that society wants to create the strongest rule to deter it so that 
the injurer is less likely to engage in the activity, given that the injurer has 
become the insurer of all injuries, then strict liability may be justified.119  
For most instances of amateur digital content, however, this description 
is the opposite of the truth for reasons discussed above. Amateur digital 
content is especially attractive as the activities that may result in injuries 
are not dangerous but instead are often highly educational and culturally 
enriching.120 This fact is a strong argument against a strict liability 
standard. 
The preceding discussion is best evaluated in light of Lessig’s argument 
for legalization of remix. The reason is that the preceding argument for a 
fault standard proceeded by comparison to the status quo. This leaves open 
the question as to whether this solution, even if preferable to the status quo, 
is nevertheless not preferable to a third alternative, which may be 
preferable to both the status quo and to the fault standard alternative. The 
obvious one to consider in this regard is the alternative offered by Lessig as 
initially set out in Part I. I will argue, however, that Lessig’s solution is 
fundamentally flawed due to its failure to appreciate the potentially 
dispositive role played by the fair use doctrine in the new world of amateur 
remix. The next Part will examine fair use as applied to remix, a topic 
conspicuously absent from Lessig’s book-length treatment of remix but is 
crucial to understanding the most appropriate means to regulate amateur-
generated content. 
III.   THE FAIR USE OF AMATEUR REMIX   
As I noted in the Introduction, the fair use analysis of remix will be 
crucial to unraveling the ultimate import of both Parts I and II and their 
interconnectivity as well. First, consider Part I: Lessig’s argument to 
legalize remix in order to avoid the current deplorable situation in which 
youthful remixers are criminals. The following fair use analysis of remix 
will have a direct, dispositive impact on this argument.  
                                                                                                                     
 119. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 192–97 (5th ed. 1998). See also Susan 
L. Pilcher, Ignorance, Discretion and the Fairness of Notice: Confronting “Apparent Innocence” 
in the Criminal Law, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 19 (1995) (discussing that strict liability has been 
supported in criminal law to deter socially undesirable risk-taking for the sake of social welfare).  
 120. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 80, at 49–50; Jenkins, supra note 1, at 278–80; 
text accompanying notes 82, 103. 
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At the same time, the fair use analysis of remix is of significant 
consequence for the issue raised in Part II, namely, whether copyright 
doctrine should adopt a more normatively-nuanced approach to the setting 
of the liability standard in copyright infringement cases, leaving room for 
application of a fault standard when appropriate. As already noted above in 
passing, the connection is that if it is the case, as I argue, that much 
amateur digital remix is fair use, then the injury-related facts that undergird 
these situations will be ones in which an unauthorized amateur use of 
copyprotected material is far from “substantially certain” to produce a 
situation in which the owner’s rights are violated by her unauthorized use. 
In such circumstances, the user risks harm but otherwise engages in a 
socially worthwhile activity. Modern negligence law emerged to deal with 
this sort of situation generally, and there appears to be no reason the same 
logic should not apply to torts that occur in fact patterns in copyright 
contexts as well.  
Before engaging in the specific fair use analysis of amateur remix, there 
are a few points worth making about fair use in general. First, fair use is 
expanding. It is common to claim the opposite, but this is done for what 
appear to be polemical purposes—perhaps admirable ones but polemical 
ones nevertheless.121 However, cases such as the search engine case Kelly 
v. Arriba Soft Corp. represent dramatic expansions in fair use of search 
engines, which are repeatedly used to access millions of copyright 
protected copies without owner authorization, and yet, the activity is 
deemed a fair use.122 This dramatic expansion in the scale of activity that 
may be deemed fair is apparently due to courts’ sensible adoption of the 
fair use factors to a changing environment in which such large-scale 
unauthorized uses do not harm the owners’ reasonable markets for their 
works; while at the same time, they provide an extraordinary benefit to 
society via the transformational and informational tool that is the search 
engine.  
This example is instructive both for showing how copyright is capable 
of expanding dramatically and for showing how technological advances are 
serving as the impetus for a reconfiguration and expansion of fair use. In 
the case of remix, the relevant technological change is the emergence of 
the set of technologies from cameras and video on phones, to easy 
uploading capability to sites such as YouTube or Flickr, to easy editing 
software. Mix all of this up and we are seeing as a result a true cultural 
explosion.  
It has become pro forma to add that most such work is dross.123 I will 
refrain. Suppose it is. Should one have expected some other result? Isn’t 
                                                                                                                     
 121. Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use: The Impact of Automated Rights Management on 
Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 579–80 (1998) (discussing the predictions 
that fair use of digital media will be reduced in the near future). 
 122. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819–20 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 123. Even Lessig cannot resist; he writes,  
[T]he breadth of this market . . . can’t help but inspire a wider range of creators. 
For reasons at the core of this book, inspiring more creativity is more important 
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this simply an instance of the law of the bell-shaped curve? Most of 
everything is mediocre by definition, right? If most professionally created 
and produced content such as movies, books, TV, etc. are mediocre, should 
we really expect more of amateurs? Nevertheless, a true cultural explosion 
is not to be dismissed lightly, and as I will argue below, fair use doctrine 
does not make this mistake. In fact, it is prepared to do just the opposite—
namely, to embrace and provide succor for much amateur-generated 
content.  
Indeed, I will argue that the unique history of fair use provides 
additional reason to suppose that courts will be especially comfortable in 
taking the initiative in facilitating the explicit expansion of fair use to 
cover amateur remix. As courts often note, the fair use doctrine developed 
in the case law and while the doctrine was codified into the 1976 Copyright 
Act,124 Congress was explicit that its goal was precisely not to freeze the 
doctrine but instead to encourage courts to allow it to change in order to 
adapt to changing circumstances.125 The explosion in amateur-generated 
content is plausibly viewed as just such a circumstance.  
Ironically, despite Congress’s explicit invitation to judicial flexibility 
and innovation, courts without exception apply the four-factor test as set 
out in the Copyright Act, although the test was itself a distillation of the 
vast run of case law involving fair use going all the way back to Folsom v. 
Marsh.126 Happily, as will now be seen, these four factors do not serve as 
the four corners of a box to contain the expansion of fair use when it is 
appropriate that it should do so. Thus, it is a virtual certainty—no pun 
intended—that courts encountering fair use defenses in infringement cases 
involving amateur remix will engage in the following sort of four-factor 
analysis.    
A.  Factor One: Purpose and Character of the Use 
Factor One of the fair use test looks to the purpose and character of the 
use.127 The two sub-factors to Factor One look to whether the use is 
commercial and whether the use is for nonprofit educational purposes.128 
                                                                                                                     
than whether you or I like the creativity we’ve inspired. 
 . . . . 
. . . I mean to romanticize the yeoman creator. In each case, the skeptic could 
argue that the product is better produced elsewhere . . . . The Long Tail enables a 
wider range of people to speak. Whatever they say, that’s a very good thing. 
Speaking teaches the speaker even if it just makes noise.  
LESSIG, supra note 5, at 130, 132.  
 124. Copyright Act of 1976, § 107, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546 (codified as 
amended at 17 U.S.C. §107 (2006)). 
 125. See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 576–78 (1994). 
 126. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901). 
 127. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006). 
 128. See id. 
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The variety and creativity of remix culture is truly astounding.129 Tushnet 
notes, “[F]anworks have expanded from mostly text-based, with occasional 
graphic art, to include music and video. These works add new characters, 
stories, or twists to the existing versions.”130 
As noted earlier, much amateur creative work is thought to be of low 
quality.131 There can be low-quality transformations as well as high-quality 
ones, however. The Bleistein non-discrimination principle counsels against 
paying attention to the perceived quality of a work.132 Accordingly, quality 
judgments are often thought to have no place in the transformative 
analysis, as was indicated by the Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc.133 In finding the work to be a parody, the Campbell court 
refused to take the further step of evaluating the quality of the parody 
(explicitly at least, seemingly in order to establish the point of doctrine—as 
the court went out of its way to make a somewhat snarky remark on the 
point in passing)134 and indeed can be seen to damn the work by faint 
praise.135 
Campbell proffers two distinct conceptions of transformativeness. The 
first test looks to whether a new work sufficiently alters the first, and the 
second looks to whether the new work promotes social welfare.136 In the 
case of remix, works will often possess each of these features. Whether a 
fanwork is sufficiently creative will, of course, turn on the standard a work 
must pass to be a new work. If the test is merely the test for new works as 
applied in the context of originality, the test will be easy to pass.137  
In the context of defining a new work for the purposes of originality, 
                                                                                                                     
 129. Jenkins breaks down fan-based remix into ten categories, including: (1) 
Recontextualization, (2) Expanding the Series Timeline, (3) Refocalization, (4) Moral Realignment, 
(5) Genre Shifting, (6) Cross Overs, (7) Character Dislocation, (8) Personalization, (9) Emotional 
Intensification, and (10) Eroticization. JENKINS, supra note 1, at 162–77. 
 130. Rebecca Tushnet, User-Generated Discontent: Transformation in Practice, 31 COLUM. 
J.L. &  ARTS 497, 503 (2008). 
 131. See, e.g., ANDREW KEEN, THE CULT OF THE AMATEUR: HOW TODAY’S INTERNET IS KILLING 
OUR CULTURE 56 (2007) (“Do we really need to wade through the tidal wave of amateurish work of 
authors who have never been professionally selected for publication?”).  
 132. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903) (discussing the 
equal copyright protection for humble advertisements as for works of high art, regardless of their 
quality). 
 133. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 582 (1994) (“The threshold question 
when fair use is raised in defense of parody is whether a parodic character may reasonably be 
perceived. Whether, going beyond that, parody is in good taste or bad does not and should not 
matter to fair use.”). 
 134. Id. at 582–83. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. at 579. 
 137. Judge Posner in Gracen v. Bradford Exchange has argued that the standard for derivative 
works is a higher one. Gracen v. Bradford Exch., 698 F.2d 300, 304–05 (7th Cir. 1983) (“The 
requirement of originality is significant chiefly in connection with derivative works, where if 
interpreted too liberally it would paradoxically inhibit rather than promote the creation of such 
works by giving the first creator a considerable power to interfere with the creation of subsequent 
derivative works from the same underlying work.”).  
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the test is binary; either the work is sufficiently original or it is not. By 
contrast, the fair use test is not binary. A work that possesses a bare 
minimum of originality so as to just pass the test to avoid being labeled  a 
derivative work would be unlikely to count as transformative in the context 
of Factor One analysis as courts are interested in the degree of 
transformation. The more transformative the work, the more weight that 
will be given to the consideration of transformative use vis-à-vis the other 
factors of the fair use test.138 
On Campbell’s second conception of transformative use, courts are 
instructed to perform a rough welfare calculation in order to measure 
transformative use by considering the social value of the use. I would 
contend that most remix works would easily pass this test as they both 
create social welfare and do not create offsetting harms. As noted in the 
introductory comments to this Part, in the search engine cases, for 
example, courts have found the role that the works in question play in the 
functioning of search engines to be a transformative use that is extremely 
socially valuable.139 
When one thinks of the welfare created by new works, it is natural to 
think in terms of the welfare that would come through consumption of the 
works. By this standard, it would appear that a low quality work would 
have a marginal impact on social welfare. And given that much remix is 
thought to be of low quality, the conclusion would seem to be that much 
remix adds little to social welfare. But the issue is more complicated as the 
utility impact may pertain not only to the work itself but to the impact on 
the people involved. Following Professor Tony Reese, Tushnet, for 
example, points to the transformation involved in remix as pertaining to 
the creator and not the work per se.140 Lessig argues that participating in 
remix culture promotes personal integrity.141 To the extent that this is true, 
there is no reason a court could not factor this into Reese’s conception of 
works that transform their creators. Lessig also argues that mere diversity 
of remix will better inspire creators.142 Tushnet argues that the fact that fan 
works are motivated for non-commercial reasons and that creators write for 
niche audiences means that a broader array of content will emerge than in a 
                                                                                                                     
 138. See, e.g., Paramount Pictures Corp. v. Carol Publ’g Group, 11 F. Supp. 2d 329, 333–37 
(S.D.N.Y. 1998) (holding that a Star Trek commentary book contained enough original expression 
to be considered a derivative work, but not enough to be transformative for the purposes of the fair 
use test). See infra notes 116–18 for a discussion on derivative works.  
 139. See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819–20 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 140. Tushnet, supra note 130, at 504 (“Transformation can also occur when someone remakes 
a work to make it more meaningful to herself and uses it as a lens to interpret the world . . . .”); see 
also R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31 COLUM. J.L. &  ARTS 
467, 494 (2008) (“[A]ppellate courts also clearly do not view the preparation of a derivative work—
or any transformation or alteration of a work’s content—as necessary to a finding that a defendant’s 
use is transformative. Instead, courts focus on whether the purpose of the defendant’s use is 
transformative.”).  
 141. LESSIG, supra note 5, at 92 (“And with a practice of writing [blogs] comes a certain 
important integrity.”).  
 142. Id. at 42. 
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context in which creators are motivated by monetary rewards.143 There is 
no reason courts cannot pay attention to these diversity benefits in their 
determinations regarding the existence of transformative use. 
Note, however, that when one applies a welfarist approach, one must be 
open to uses that may be socially deleterious as well. An important albeit 
controversial example is pornography. J.K. Rowling and George Lucas, the 
owners of the Harry Potter and the Star Wars characters, respectively, 
have each noted that they are opposed to pornographic uses of their works 
by fans.144 In the rapidly evolving world of digital remixing technology, 
these authors could expect to see remixed pornographic content drawing 
from feature-length Harry Potter and Star Wars films. Thus, while it is fair 
to conclude that much fan fiction and remix is transformative—both 
because these works contain new forms of expression, meaning, and 
message and because they are generally productive of social welfare— the 
logic of a welfarist approach to transformative use forces the conclusion 
that some works may be transformative yet arguably productive of 
disutility. 
Next, consider the sub-factor of commercial use.145 Some forms of 
remix are non-commercial by design, and indeed, the definition of fan 
fiction sometimes includes that it is non-commercial.146 Writers of fan 
fiction have frequently heralded the non-commercial nature of fan fiction 
as one of its core virtues.147 Jenkins has discussed some of the ways in 
which creators of remix sometimes seek commercial gain. In the past, 
                                                                                                                     
 143. Tushnet, supra note 130, at 507 (“[N]oncommercial creative uses, precisely because they 
are not motivated by copyright’s profit-based incentives, are more likely to contain content that the 
market would not produce or sustain. . . .”). 
 144. See JENKINS, supra note 3, at 150 (describing warnings by Lucasfilm to fans in the early 
1980s not to publish erotic Star Wars stories); E-mail from Theodore Goddard, Attorneys for 
Christopher Little Literary Agency and Warner Brothers, to unnamed Harry Potter fan (Jan. 22, 
2003), available at http://www.chillingeffects.org/fanfic/notice.cgi?action=image_337 (reprinting a 
cease-and-desist letter sent to the owner of a website dedicated to Harry Potter fan fiction on behalf 
of J.K. Rowling’s literary agency, which expressed concern that children might come across the 
sexually explicit content). 
 145. See Lydia Pallas Loren, The Pope’s Copyright? Aligning Incentives with Reality by Using 
Creative Motivation to Shape Copyright Protection, 69 LA. L. REV. 1, 31 (2008) (“The first factor 
involves examining ‘the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a 
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes.’” (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2000))). 
 146. See Tushnet, supra note 1, at 655 (stating that part of the definition of fan fiction as “not 
produced as ‘professional’ writing”); Fiesler, supra note 91, at 731–32 (“[F]an fiction is understood 
to be ‘unauthorized’ and ‘not-for-profit.’”). Tushnet also defines “fanworks” as “noncommercial” 
for the purposes of protection under the Organization for Transformative Works. Tushnet, supra 
note 130, at 501. 
 147. See JENKINS, supra note 1, at 158 (noting that even as fan fiction becomes more prevalent, 
“fanzines continue to be a mode of amateur, non-profit publication”); Tushnet, supra note 1, at 
657–58 (“Fans also see themselves as guardians of the texts they love, purer than the owners in 
some ways because they seek no profit. They believe that their emotional and financial investment 
in the characters gives them moral rights to create with these characters.”); Fiesler, supra note 91, at 
747–48 (describing the “thou shalt not profit” rule as a self-enforced constraint on the fan fiction 
community). 
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however, these efforts have been relatively insignificant.148 This has been 
true for a few reasons: first, due to quality differentials with the 
commercial works upon which they are built; second, because of the norm 
against commercializing fanworks discussed above; and third, out of fear 
that commercial use might occasion unwanted attention from the owners of 
the underlying works.149  
There have been relatively few litigated cases involving non-
commercial uses. As a result, past discussion of fair use of fan fiction and 
remix has relied almost exclusively on comparisons with cases such as 
Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publishing or the Rocky case.150 
Each of these cases involved a commercial defendant. In each case, the use 
was found to be unfair. In Bridgeport, a commercially successful musician, 
Sean “P. Diddy” Combs, incorporated music samples without 
authorization (or attribution) and was found to be an infringer.151 By 
contrast, in a fact pattern similar to Bridgeport but involving a one-second 
sample used by a child creating an amateur remix, I would confidently 
predict that a court would almost surely find fair use. Moreover, I would 
speculate that a court would find such a use to be fair even if the use was 
only marginally transformative. The consideration of non-commercial use 
is a potentially powerful fair use factor and would be a dominant 
consideration in cases such as these.  
Finally, in addition to being overwhelmingly transformational and non-
commercial in nature, fanworks and remix are plausibly characterized as 
promoting important educational values, which is a goal explicitly 
mentioned in § 107 of the Copyright Act.152 
As the above examination of Factor One considerations shows, typical 
remix is likely to be both transformative and non-commercial. Given that 
Factor One is the most important of the four factors, the above Factor One 
considerations count strongly toward the fair use of most amateur remix.  
B.  Factor Two: Nature of the Copied Work 
Factor Two of the fair use test considers the nature of the work that is 
copied without owner authorization. The factor has two sub-factors: first, 
whether the work is published, and second, whether the work is creative as 
compared to factual in nature.153 Much fan fiction and remix culture draw 
from unauthorized works that are published, which counts in favor of the 
                                                                                                                     
 148. JENKINS, supra note 3, at 139–44. 
 149. Fiesler, supra note 91, at 749 (noting that most fan fiction writers are worried that if 
anyone begins to profit from the unauthorized works, it will attract the negative attention of 
copyright owners).  
 150. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Justin Combs Publ’g, 507 F.3d 470 (6th Cir. 2007); Anderson 
v. Stallone, No. 87-0592 WDKGX, 1989 WL 206431 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 1989). 
 151. Bridgeport, 507 F.3d at 476–77.  
 152. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006). 
 153. See Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Commc’n Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 
1245 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“The second factor focuses on two different aspects of the copyrighted 
work: whether it is published or unpublished and whether it is informational or creative.”). 
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putative fair user. Here, the term “published” is used in its standard sense 
as a legal term of art in which commercial film, video, book, etc. can all be 
said to be published. It is worth noting, however, that the concept is likely 
to become increasingly problematic. For instance, if an amateur digital 
creator grabs some content from a friend’s Facebook page, has she copied 
a published work? Other things equal, the more inclined courts are to see 
such works as unpublished, the more their unauthorized use will be 
frowned upon by fair use.  
Consider the second sub-factor, namely, where the work resides on the 
creative versus informational side of the content spectrum. Once again, the 
sorts of uses that have garnered the greatest attention thus far are 
unauthorized uses of popular commercial content, which is by-and-large 
creative in nature. But again, the sorts of uses that are likely to increase in 
prevalence are likely to test this distinction. For example, if friend A grabs 
a photo from friend B’s Facebook page, what set of criteria is appropriate 
to determining whether the borrowed work is informational or creative? To 
the extent that such works are deemed creative, other things equal, the fair 
use doctrine will frown upon the use.  
Suppose the current situation is one in which the predominant number  
of borrowed works is both published  and creative. In other words, each of 
the Factor Two sub-factors points in the opposite direction. In such 
instances, courts typically find that the second factor disfavors fair use. 
Thus, Factor Two will typically work against a finding of fair use, at least 
in the present one and ones similar to it. It is noteworthy, then, that courts 
have typically characterized Factor Two as the least important of the fair 
use factors.154 Thus, the damage to the fair use bona fides of amateur 
digital remix and fan fiction from the application of Factor Two will be 
minimal. 
C.  Factor Three: Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used 
Factor Three takes account of the amount of the underlying work that is 
copied as well as the value of the portion taken. Many courts have referred 
to the qualitative component as the “heart of the work.”155 There appears to 
be no typical case for purposes of Factor Three analysis when it comes to 
amateur digital works. Some remix draws heavily from the underlying 
works, either quantitatively, qualitatively, or both, while other works draw 
relatively little from the underlying works and add much that is creative 
                                                                                                                     
 154. See Loren, supra note 145, at 31 (“While the Supreme Court has indicated that all four 
factors must be considered and no presumptions should be employed, it has become clear in the 
case law that often the first and fourth factors dominate the analysis, with the third and second 
factors trailing in significance, in that order.”). 
 155. See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 564–65 (1985) 
(“Next, the Act directs us to examine the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to 
the copyrighted work as a whole. In absolute terms, the words actually quoted were an insubstantial 
portion of ‘A Time to Heal.’ The District Court, however, found that ‘[T]he Nation took what was 
essentially the heart of the book.’” (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 557 
F. Supp. 1067, 1072 (S.D.N.Y. 1983))). 
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and original. All else equal, the former category of works will count in 
favor of the owner while the latter will count in favor of the user.  
Even in those instances in which the third factor might have in the past 
counted against second users, courts are increasingly inclined to note that 
Factor Three must be judged in light of Factor One.156 In other words, the 
more transformative the use, the less that Factor Three is likely to matter. 
Following Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. and 
Campbell, courts and commentators now go so far as to note that when a 
work is sufficiently transformative, a use may be fair despite the fact that a 
complete copy of the work is used without permission.157 It is noteworthy 
that this balancing act typically does not seek to factor in the other sub-
factor of Factor One besides transformativeness, namely, commercial 
versus non-commercial nature of the borrowed work. This is a 
consequence of the fact that the issue has nearly always arisen in cases 
involving commercial uses. In the context of amateur remix, however, the 
underlying factual situation is likely to be different in a relevant manner. 
The Factor One sub-factor of non-commercial use would work in tandem 
with the transformative element of the use to be set off against the amount 
and substantiality of the portion used. In an amateur remix context, then, it 
presumably will require less transformativeness than would otherwise be 
necessary to offset the Factor Three consideration of the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used due to the non-commercial nature of the 
fanwork.158 This consideration again highlights the importance of the 
amateurishness of amateur-generated content. 
In general, however, as we move from a world of fan fiction to a world 
of remix, Factor Three will likely play a more important role in influencing 
fair use outcomes in a direction unfavorable to fair use. It is reasonable to 
predict that the amount taken will be a function of technology, such that as 
it becomes less costly to make digital copies of large files such as feature-
length films, people will be inclined to make more full-length copies of 
                                                                                                                     
 156. See generally Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 
1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549, 615–16 (2008) (discussing the various outcomes by courts 
using the multifactor fair use test and the importance of one factor over another). 
 157. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 569 (1994). 
 158. See, e.g., Sony Corp., 464 U.S. at 449–50 (“[T]he fact that the entire work is 
reproduced . . . does not [in certain circumstances] have its ordinary effect of militating against a 
finding of fair use.”); see also Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587 (“[R]eproduction of entire work ‘does not 
have its ordinary effect of militating against a finding of fair use’ as to home videotaping of 
television programs” (quoting Sony, 464 U.S. at 449–50)). Factor One considerations will not 
always trump Factor Three considerations, however. In Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates, for 
instance, the court found that the defendants had taken too much to be justified by the other factors, 
including the transformative nature of the work. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 
757 (9th Cir. 1978) (“[I]t is our view that defendants took more than is allowed even under the 
Berlin test as applied to both the conceptual and physical aspects of the characters.”). Professor 
Pamela Samuelson has recently questioned whether Air Pirates would be decided in the same 
manner today. Pamela Samuelson, U bundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2550 n.70 
(2009).   
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unauthorized works as their starting point. Compare this situation to that 
which pertains to fan fiction in which the creator takes the ideas of the 
characters and then does all the writing of the new work on her own using 
these characters as grist. The former sorts of uses are more likely to lead to 
market harm and thus are less likely to be fair uses. For instance, if one 
reads a random sampling of the many thousands of fan fiction works 
written using Twilight characters, one will see that they are typically of 
such low quality from a market perspective that they pose absolutely no 
threat to the market for the original.159 The opposite is true if one starts 
from a complete digital copy and removes very little, as the resulting work 
will be more likely to have commercial value because the work remains 
largely the original work. Other things equal, the more that is taken from 
the original and the more substantial the part taken, the more likely there is 
to be market harm as a result of market substitution.160 This effect is much 
more likely when the creator begins from a full copy of the work as 
compared to taking a snippet to use as a small part of a larger whole. Thus, 
better technology is in tension with fair use in this respect. Nevertheless, 
on the whole, Factor Three will not preclude fair use when works are 
transformative and non-commercial, as appears to be the case for the 
preponderance of remix works.  
D.  Factor Four: Harm to Actual and Potential Market 
Factor Four takes account of whether the unauthorized use will harm 
the market for the original. Because a significant number of remixes are 
transformative and non-commercial, they will not harm the market for the 
owner’s original work.161 In the case law, there is an inverse relationship 
between transformative uses and the Factor Four consideration of harm to 
the market of the unauthorized work. In other words, the more 
transformative a work, the less likely for there to be market harm because 
the works are increasingly dissimilar and thus less likely to compete in the 
same market. Campbell notes that,  
[W]hen a commercial use amounts to mere duplication of 
the entirety of an original, it clearly “supersede[s] the objects” 
of the original and serves as a market replacement for it, 
making it likely that cognizable market harm to the original 
                                                                                                                     
 159. See Lipton, supra note 13 (manuscript at 20). 
 160. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587–88 (“[W]hether ‘a substantial portion of the infringing work 
was copied verbatim’ from the copyrighted work is a relevant question, . . . for it may reveal a 
dearth of transformative character or purpose under the first factor, or a greater likelihood of market 
harm under the fourth; a work composed primarily of an original, particularly its heart, with little 
added or changed, is more likely to be a merely superseding use, fulfilling demand for the original.” 
(quoting Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 565)). 
 161. Id. at 591 (noting that there is only a presumption of market harm in the case of 
commercial works, “‘[i]f the intended use is for commercial gain, that likelihood may be presumed. 
But if it is for a noncommercial purpose, the likelihood must be demonstrated.’” (quoting Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc. v. Campbell, 972 F.2d 1429, 1438 (6th Cir. 1992)). 
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will occur. But when, on the contrary, the second use is 
transformative, market substitution is at least less certain, and 
market harm may not be so readily inferred.162 
A parallel case can be made that the more non-commercial a work, the 
less likely it is to hurt the market for the underlying work that it uses 
without authorization. Indeed, the opposite is increasingly true in 
increasingly interesting ways. As Tushnet notes, “[F]anworks encourage 
and sustain a vibrant fan community that helps authorized versions 
thrive . . . .”163 The connection to fair use is of course that the lower risk 
of market harm, the more likely the use is to be fair. Note as well that the 
alleged inadequacies in quality of amateur works bemoaned by author 
Andrew Keen and others164 would work to make it more likely that the 
uses are fair, given that low quality works are less likely to steal a 
defendant’s market.  
A more difficult question is whether amateur digital works hurt the 
market for derivative works. Not all possible derivative works markets are 
protected—only those that are reasonably likely to be exploited by 
owners.165 Remixes are often idiosyncratic to a particular creator and are 
thus not geared toward a reasonable, commercial market. Hence, they are 
unlikely to come into disfavor for fair use purposes due to harm to 
potential markets. 
There is a second point to note that may also work in favor of amateur 
creators and perhaps especially creators of digital remix as compared to 
traditional fan fiction. Contrary to the implicit suggestion of some 
commentary, not all fan fiction and remix are likely to count as derivative 
works. Derivative works are “recast, transformed, or adapted” from the 
original.166 This characterization will be true for many works built on top 
of the original works such that the original works, or elements of them, 
such as key characters, remain recognizable and often continue to remain a 
large presence in the new work. These sorts of works are plausibly 
characterized as transforming, recasting, or adapting the original and thus 
may put the creator in the position of being alleged to be an infringer of the 
owner’s derivative works right. In other instances, however, it is not apt to 
characterize the new work as a “derivative” of the original. For example, 
music mash-ups are an important category of remix. Mash-up artists often 
use large numbers of unauthorized works in the process of creating their 
music.167 For instance, the remixer behind Girl Talk uses tens of 
                                                                                                                     
 162. Id. (internal citations omitted).  
 163. Tushnet, supra note 130, at 503. 
 164. KEEN, supra note 131, at 56.  
 165. See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 592 (“The market for potential derivative uses includes only 
those that creators of original works would in general develop or license others to develop.”). 
 166. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). 
 167. See Rob Walker, Mash-up Model—Girl Talk, N.Y. TIMES (Magazine), July 20, 2008, at 
15 (noting that Girl Talk’s newest collection of songs “is composed almost entirely of more than 
200 samples of other artists’ music, ranging from Lil Wayne to Kenny Loggins—none of which 
[Girl Talk] has obtained permission to use”). 
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unauthorized snippets.168 It cannot plausibly be claimed that the new work 
is a recasting, adaptation, or transformation of all or of any one of these 
works in particular. This feature should work to the benefit of remix when 
it comes to fair use, as fewer of these works can colorably be alleged to 
violate the derivative works right because fewer of these works are 
derivative.  
E.  Balancing the Factors 
Having considered each of the four factors of the fair use test, the next 
step is to balance them. The Copyright Act provides no guidance as to how 
to do so. Nevertheless, as noted in passing above, courts have developed 
doctrines with regard to the relative weighing of these factors. We saw that 
much remix will win on 3.5 out of 4 of the fair use factors, including the 
two that courts consider most important, the first and fourth factors.169 
Generally speaking, then, remixes are fair uses. To be clear, my claim is 
that these uses are fair presently and not just in some counterfactual world 
in which a court actually performs a fair use test. I state this in the 
Holmesian sense that law is the best prediction of what judges will do.170
My claim is that because judges presented with most examples of fan 
fiction and remix as they have existed thus far would find such uses to be 
fair, these uses are fair now.  
As was seen above, however, not all remix works are fair uses. For 
instance, as noted in the discussion of Factor Three above, some amateur 
remixes may pose significant threats to the market for the original if they 
use too much of the work in proportion to the amount of transformative 
change. Additionally, we cannot rely on static analysis because the sorts of 
works we are likely to see in the future will in part be determined by the 
form of regulation of remix that is adopted. In particular, if amateur remix 
is made legal—at least in the manner proposed by Lessig—we could 
expect to see an increase in near copies of complete works with only minor 
changes. It is quite foreseeable that works such as this could displace the 
owner’s market for the original, especially given that Lessig appears to 
promote the legalization of commercial as well as non-commercial 
remix.171 We see, then, that while there may be a vast number of fair uses, 
there are significant unfair uses as well. This fact will come into play in the 
next Part. For present purposes, what matters is the overall finding that 
much remix is fair use.  
Lessig argues that fair use is too complex for ordinary people to apply, 
the implication being that legalization will provide a bright-line rule now 
lacking under fair use analysis.172 This problem is not solved by making 
amateur remixes legal, however, as creators will still need to engage with 
fair use law to the extent that their use may—and will typically—implicate 
                                                                                                                     
 168. Id. 
 169. See supra Parts III.A–D. 
 170. Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 78 B.U. L. REV. 699, 702 (1998). 
 171. See supra note 79 and accompanying text. 
 172. LESSIG, supra note 5, at 269–71.  
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other copyrights. In other words, Lessig’s proposal will not achieve the 
bright line to which he aspires. To see this, imagine a type of use that is 
likely to be common were amateur remix to be made legal: the Clean 
Flicks model of digitizing a movie and then deleting violent and sexually 
explicit scenes.173 An example of such a use would be the movie Titanic 
without the steamy scene of Kate Winslet topless. Were the owner unable 
to sue for violations of its right to derivative works because amateur remix 
was legal, the owner could still sue under the theory that this was an 
unauthorized copy. The defendant would then proffer a fair use defense, 
claiming this use as a transformative remix. There is no reason, however, 
that a transformative work cannot also constitute an infringing “copy” as 
this term is understood in its technical, legal sense.174 Consider a paradigm 
case in copyright law, Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., as 
an example.175 In this case, the defendant produced a poster to promote the 
film Moscow on the Hudson that the court held was an unauthorized use of 
plaintiff’s well-known The New Yorker cover.176 While the poster was 
clearly a transformative-derivative work, it was also successfully alleged to 
involve elements of exact copying.177 Thus, ordinary users will still need to 
be able to distinguish remixes that involve making illicit copies of the 
originals from those that do not. The determining factor will typically 
involve the fair use test. Thus, fair use doctrine cannot be avoided after all. 
In other words, Lessig must acknowledge that producers of remix culture 
will not be able to avoid the issue of fair use because any putative user has 
to be in a position to determine if making the transformative remix or 
derivative work also involves the making of a fair use copy with regard to 
the “remix,” qua copy. Thus, again, we see that legalization of remix in the 
manner proposed by Lessig fails as a panacea. 
F.  Lenz v. Universal 
In general, one of the problems in discussing amateur remix is that the 
topic is so new that directly relevant case law has yet to develop. There is, 
however, an exception to this regrettable state of affairs: the recent seminal 
case, Lenz v. Universal Music Corp.178 It will be instructive to close out 
this Part with a discussion of this case because it indicates the potential for 
an expanded role for fair use in the context of amateur remix.   
Lenz gained a good deal of media attention because it was yet another 
                                                                                                                     
 173. See Clean Flicks of Colo., L.L.C. v. Soderbergh, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236, 1238 (D. Colo. 
2006) (noting the process by which Clean Flicks deletes “sex, nudity, profanity and gory violence” 
from movies and redistributes them). 
 174. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2006) (providing that a copyright owner maintains the exclusive 
right “to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies”). 
 175. 663 F. Supp. 706 (S.D.N.Y. 1987). 
 176. Id. at 708–09. 
 177. See id. at 713–14 (finding “copyright infringement” even where “not all of the details are 
identical” because all that is needed is a “substantial similarity that involves only a small portion of 
each work”). 
 178. 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
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instance in which the commercial copyright industry sued a particularly 
sympathetic plaintiff for an act that while technically a colorable instance 
of infringement, nevertheless appears to the common person to be 
acceptable. The facts of the case, in short, are that an eighteen-month-old 
child spontaneously began dancing to a Prince song, and the mother 
recorded it on a video and posted it on YouTube.179 Universal filed a 
takedown notice pursuant to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA), the mother objected, and the Electric Frontier Foundation took 
the case pro bono after the situation gained attention.180  
Interestingly, Lessig begins the introduction to his book with the facts 
of this case,181 contrasting it with what he would call a “fair and justified” 
use of the law, one in which Universal might, for example, demand the 
takedown of a “new television series with high-priced ads.”182 Lessig 
argues that in the Lenz case the use of the law is neither fair nor justified 
because:  
The Prince song on Lenz’s video, however, was something 
completely different. First, the quality of the recording was 
terrible. No one would download Lenz’s video to avoid 
paying Prince for his music. Likewise, neither Prince nor 
Universal was in the business of selling the right to video-cam 
your baby dancing to their music. There is no market in 
licensing music to amateur video. Thus, there was no 
plausible way in which Prince or Universal was being harmed 
by Stephanie Lenz’s sharing this video of her kid dancing 
with her family, friends, and whoever else saw it.183  
Lessig brushes aside discussion of any further details of the case, noting 
that there will be “plenty of time to consider the particulars of a copyright 
claim like this in the pages that follow.”184 However, in the rest of the book 
there is no discussion of a case of remix in which Lessig discusses either 
fair use or allegations of criminal conduct. Lessig then turns to the larger 
point: 
What is it that allows these lawyers and executives to take 
a case like this seriously, to believe there’s some important 
social or corporate reason to deploy the federal scheme of 
regulation called copyright to stop the spread of these images 
and music? “Let’s Go Crazy”? Indeed! What has brought the 
American legal system to the point that such behavior by a 
leading corporation is considered anything but “crazy”? Or to 
                                                                                                                     
 179. Id. at 1151–52; see also LESSIG, supra note 5, at 1 (stating that Ms. Lenz’s son started 
dancing upon hearing Prince’s song).   
 180. Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d at 1152–53; LESSIG, supra note 5, at 3. 
 181. LESSIG, supra note 5, at 1–4. 
 182. Id. at 2. 
 183. Id. at 2–3. 
 184. Id. at 4.  
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put it the other way around, who have we become that such 
behavior seems sane to anyone?185  
What Lessig does not discuss, however, is that this case is a 
counterexample to his basic thesis about the criminality of amateur remix. 
The real meaning of the case is precisely the opposite of that which is 
implied by the manner in which the case is represented by Lessig. Lenz 
disputed the infringement claim, asserting fair use, and then she sued 
Universal for submitting a takedown request to YouTube without first 
making a good faith effort to determine whether the use was fair—and 
hence authorized under the law.186  
Lenz won the case, establishing a potential precedent that could 
strongly promote the ability of amateur remixers to show their works. If 
courts in other jurisdictions follow Lenz, it will no longer be enough for the 
owner of an underlying work to file a takedown demand based simply on 
the fact that some amount of her work was used in a remix. In addition, an 
owner filing a takedown notice must represent that it has a good faith 
belief that the use is not a fair use.187 Given the fair use analysis provided 
above showing that much remix is fair use, the obvious but important 
implication is that there will be much remix for which commercial owners 
of underlying works will not be able to make good faith representations of 
infringement. This means in turn that there should be a drop in the DMCA 
takedown notices filed by owners such as Universal, particularly for those 
cases in which the use is very likely fair and the owner would otherwise 
have been able to prevail simply due to the asymmetry in power and 
resources between corporate owners and amateur remixers. After Lenz, 
taking such actions, if not well supported in terms of fair use analysis, may 
subject an owner to a finding of misrepresentation under the DMCA.188 
The end result is that this case is strongly supportive of the fair use rights 
of amateur remixers. 
IV.   AMATEUR DIGITAL REMIX : FREE AS IN PERMISSIBLE 
Recall why we engaged in the preceding fair use analysis in the first 
place. The fact that amateur remix is predominantly fair use goes directly 
toward refuting Lessig’s claim that “[r]emixing is criminal.”189 A use that 
                                                                                                                     
 185. Id. at 4–5.  
 186. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1152–53 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (“On 
July 24, 2007, Lenz filed suit against Universal alleging misrepresentation pursuant to 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(f) and tortious interference with her contract with YouTube.”). 
 187. See id. at 1156 (“A good faith consideration of whether a particular use is fair use is 
consistent with the purpose of the statute.”). 
 188. See id. at 1154–55 (“An allegation that a copyright owner acted in bad faith by issuing a 
takedown notice without proper consideration of the fair use doctrine thus is sufficient to state a 
misrepresentation claim pursuant to Section 512(f) of the DMCA.”). On the need for fair use safe 
harbors generally, see Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA. L. 
REV. 1483, 1502–03 (2007) (suggesting that because of overdeterrence and uncertainty, fair use 
should be reformed to recognize certain types of copying as per se fair). 
 189. See Hetcher, supra note 17, at 1896. Lessig writes that: 
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is fair is not an infringement.190 A use that is not an infringement is a 
fortiori not a criminal infringement. Accordingly, the fundamental legal 
claim undergirding Lessig’s set of arguments is false.  
A.  No Presumption of Illegality 
As noted above, Lessig says almost nothing in Remix about fair use. 
The few remarks that he does provide, however, are of great interest 
because they tie the doctrine of fair use directly to his criminality 
argument. Lessig writes, “Once triggered, the law requires either a license 
or a valid claim of ‘fair use.’ Licenses are scarce; defending a claim of ‘fair 
use’ is expensive. By default, RW [Read/Write] use violates copyright law. 
RW culture is thus presumptively illegal.”191 Lessig’s claim here is 
essentially that because amateurs cannot afford to establish fair use, they 
are infringers—or rather, presumptive infringers—as their actions are 
“presumptively illegal.”  
This argument is fallacious. Users are only fairly characterized as 
infringers if their use, when evaluated by a court, would fail to pass the fair 
use test. It is true that if one is a fair user and is sued, one may, for all 
practical purposes, be equivalent to an infringer in the sense that one will 
typically not be able to establish one’s fair use status for monetary reasons 
and thus will lose by default. Crucially, however, this does not make one 
an infringer—or even a presumptive infringer—but rather a fair user who 
is not in a position, practically speaking, to vindicate her legal rights. It is 
well and good to point to a situation of corporate actors using the legal 
system to achieve favorable outcomes despite the actual law on the issue. 
But, if anything, this provides all the more reason to insist upon the fact, 
and highlight the fact, that most of the amateur uses at issue are indeed fair 
and therefore legal. Indeed, it is this very fact that makes the actions of 
corporate owners so detestable.  
Conceptualizing this point in terms of possible world semantics may 
help to clarify what it means to talk about fair use in a context in which 
there is almost no established case law to provide a better indication of the 
legal status of various uses. Considered as alternative possible scenarios, 
there is a meaningful difference between talking about case results as 
precedent and considering the status of fair use as a matter of prediction in 
a world without precedent. Two different sets of possible worlds are 
relevant in the present context.192 In one set, litigants actually go to court 
                                                                                                                     
In a world in which technology begs all of us to create and spread creative work 
differently from how it was created and spread before, what kind of moral platform 
will sustain our kids, when their ordinary behavior is deemed criminal? Who will 
they become? What other crimes will to them seem natural?  
LESSIG, supra note 5, at xviii.  
 190. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
 191. LESSIG, supra note 5, at 100. 
 192. See generally SAUL A. KRIPKE, NAMING AND NECESSITY 15–20 (1980) (explaining and 
defending the use of “possible world” semantics).  
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and a fair use determination is produced. Based on the fair use analysis 
provided above, my claim is that in these worlds, most amateur remixers 
are found to be fair users. In the second set of possible worlds of interest, 
overbearing commercial owners harass fair users such that for practical 
reasons they stop their use voluntarily or default in a lawsuit. In such 
worlds, many potential users would never attempt to undertake fair uses in 
the first place, due to the chilling effects of previous actions taken by 
owners against fair users. In this second set of possible worlds, courts do 
not produce fair use case law. In these worlds, the uses are not held to be 
unfair as there is simply no legal determination on the merits. Losing a 
lawsuit by default does not turn a fair use into an unfair use.  
Moreover, while Lessig claims that remix is “presumptively illegal,”193 
he fails to explain what this claim entails. The passive tense of the 
statement begs the question as to whom is presuming the illegality. If he is 
referring to those worlds where owners intimidate fair users, it is not the 
case that there is any presumption of illegality. While the users themselves 
would feel that owners have treated them unfairly, this feeling—quite the 
opposite of a presumption of illegality—is a reflection of the fact that the 
users will have a belief, implicit or explicit, that their use is fair.  
Nor is there reason to think that the owners would make such a 
presumption. If commercial owners have good lawyers, these lawyers 
should be able to dispassionately predict what a court would be inclined to 
find with regard to fair use. If I am right that most remix is fair use, then 
one would expect owners’ lawyers to reach this conclusion as well.194 It 
should be noted as well that courts are not presuming illegality for the very 
reason that fair users are practically prevented from seeking to legally 
vindicate their fair use claims. Consequently, courts are not even made 
aware of the dispute. Thus, they are certainly not in a position to develop a 
specific legal opinion regarding fair use—namely, that it is presumptively 
illegal.  
Summing up the preceding discussion, it is simply a mistake to think 
that because some party is not in a position to vindicate a legal right that 
therefore the party no longer has this right. So too, if an unauthorized use is 
fair, it remains so even if the user is not able to benefit from this otherwise 
favorable legal fact, either because the party is intimidated or otherwise 
practically disabled from exercising the right. Thus, it is incorrect to think 
that remix is presumptively illegal. In other words, Lessig’s crucial 
conception of kid remix is incorrect. 
B.  Fair Use and Criminality 
As discussed in Part I, Lessig claims that because remix is criminal, this 
will lead to disrespect for the law and more criminal activity. This claim 
implicitly relies on an assumption of perfect information. This assumption 
is a frequent move in arguments in a traditional law and economic vein, 
                                                                                                                     
 193. See supra text accompanying note 191. 
 194. Needless to say, this fact need not deter them from harassing amateur creators, should 
they deem it most strategic to do so. 
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particularly of a Chicago School variety. While Lessig is intimately versed 
in this approach, having taught at Chicago and clerked for Judge Richard 
Posner on the Seventh Circuit, he is not a self-identified advocate of the 
school, and thus, it is more incumbent upon him to explain why he is 
implicitly drawing on the assumption of perfect information here, 
especially in light of the fact that the on-the-ground facts suggest the 
opposite. “It is not well known that such activities would [potentially] be 
criminal. Unless one was specifically knowledgeable regarding intellectual 
property law, one would not know whether an unauthorized remix, when 
not a fair use and willful, is criminal.”195 Indeed, this claim is so 
counterintuitive to common sense that one who believed the law generally 
made sense would be inclined to doubt that the rule could be such. The fact 
that  
[S]uch a rule is so equitably counterintuitive that one would 
not expect it to exist, [is a fact that] cuts against the grain of 
Lessig’s larger argument. . . . [I]f people are not told that a 
certain behavior is criminal, . . . [and are not charged with 
crimes by prosecutors for engaging in such behavior], then the 
claim that [kids] are suffering the negative effects of being 
labeled as criminals [appears without foundation].196  
Not only are remix kids not labeled as criminals, except by Lessig,197 
but they receive information that would lead them to reasonably conclude 
the opposite, were they actually to think about the issue.  
Consider the impact of social-networking sites like 
YouTube or MySpace. When kids go to these sites, they find 
large numbers of amateur videos, many of which remix from 
commercial sources to some extent. From this fact, it would 
be natural to conclude, if only implicitly, that such videos are 
not criminal. These sites are not on the fringes of mainstream 
culture—quite the opposite—yet no one is shutting down 
YouTube or telling [kids] not to upload videos to it.  
Indeed, . . . there are strong social norms supporting remix. 
Lessig’s second argument implicitly depends on a general 
social understanding that remix activity is criminal activity 
and likely to serve as a gateway crime.198 
                                                                                                                     
 195. Hetcher, supra note 17, at 1920. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Lessig’s book is published by a non-academic press. This means that Lessig’s arguments 
stand to have a greater real-world impact by enriching public debate and hopefully public policy. 
This can be a double-edged sword, however, because if I am right that Lessig’s main argument is 
wrong, then enhanced public exposure may result in enhanced public harm, namely, a world in 
which kids are wrongly characterized as criminals.  
 198. Hetcher, supra note 17, at 1920–21. 
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One essential element of a gateway crime is the presence of a social 
dimension, such that by taking part in the gateway crime, one begins to 
associate with a new group of people who themselves are already engaged 
in a wider array of criminal activities.199 By associating with such a group, 
one is naturally exposed to more criminal associations and consequently 
this leads to criminal opportunities. Fan fiction and remix do not involve 
this social dimension, however. Acts of amateur creation have no tendency 
to bring kids into greater contact with criminals. Thus, Lessig’s argument 
based on the threat of a burgeoning criminal culture blossoming in the 
wake of a failure of legislators to legalize remix is also without foundation.   
The fair use of significant amounts of remix works also affects Lessig’s 
claim that institutions of literacy will be deterred from teaching the sorts of 
skills that would promote the flowering of remix culture.200 He offers 
almost no direct support for this claim. Rather, it is presented in a 
conclusory fashion, apparently drawn from the implicit premises that remix 
is criminal and that schools, by their nature, do not teach criminal 
activities.201 This argument is faulty. Consider the most compelling 
conceptual reason first. The skills that one needs to be a criminal remixer 
are exactly the same as those one needs to be a professional remixer 
working at places like Pixar or Disney. One cannot teach students one set 
of skills without teaching them the other. Art and design schools would by 
their nature consider it part of their core mission to teach students the skills 
they need to qualify for employment at companies such as these. Given that 
for commercial content companies, the shift to digital is a fait accompli at 
this point, it would therefore be highly surprising if students were not 
learning to create and manipulate digital content. Indeed, if their training is 
not in digital design—which, I would suggest, is but a form of remix—
what else would these students be learning? Lessig’s failure to address fair 
use leads him astray here; because much remix is fair use and thus legal, 
schools have every reason to teach these skills and no reason not to. 
Finally, it is worth noting that it is in educational settings in particular that 
unauthorized uses are more likely to be fair (and moreover, that to the 
extent that Lessig wishes to be committed to a traditional Chicago-style 
view of full information, he commits himself to the view that these 
potential users should be charged with knowledge of the fairness of their 
uses).202  
                                                                                                                     
 199. Stephen Pudney, The Road to Ruin? Sequences of Initiation to Drugs and Crime in 
Britain, 113 ECON. J. C182, C183 (2003) (noting that one of the causes of the “gateway effect” is 
social interaction, i.e., meeting people one would not otherwise have met).  
 200. LESSIG, supra note 5, at 108 (“[T]he law as it stands now will stanch the development of 
the institutions of literacy that are required if this literacy is to spread. Schools will shy away, since 
this remix is presumptively illegal.”). 
 201. Id. 
 202. See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006) (providing that “the purpose and character of [a] use, 
including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes” 
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Lessig’s overall argument for legalization had four premises. The only 
one I have contested is the first premise, that “[r]emixes cause no harm.”203 
The second premise appears unproblematic. Lessig claims that “[c]reative 
practices that cause no harm should not be impeded by the law.”204 This 
premise is unobjectionable for a whole range of normative views that 
assume that one is free to do as one wishes as long as there is no issue of 
countervailing harms to others. This is the famous “harm principle” that is 
at the core of Millian consequentialist jurisprudence.205 Nor is the third 
premise objectionable. It reads: “Creative practices that produce social 
benefits should be promoted by copyright law.”206 This follows from a 
basic consequentialist approach, which at its core values welfare-enhancing 
outcomes. The fourth premise of Lessig’s argument is also 
unobjectionable. He contends that, “Remix culture creates social 
benefits.”207 The truth of this claim is seen in passing throughout the 
previous discussion. Lessig wishes to draw the conclusion that, “Therefore, 
remix cultural practices should not be impeded but instead supported by 
legal rules.”208  
With regard to the premise that I do dispute, the earlier discussion of 
harm in the context of fair use supports this view. Amateur remix culture is 
not an unalloyed good such that policy issues never arise or that tradeoffs 
never need to be made regarding its regulation. While much remix is a fair 
use, not all is. As noted above, the clearest type of harm for which I predict 
there would be a significant degree of consensus is the harm to the 
exclusive right of copyright that would be possible in a world in which it 
would be legal to, for example, make full-length remixes of newly released 
feature-length films.209 In stark contrast to traditional fan fiction, these 
remixes very plausibly could hurt the market for the originals.  
Unfair uses are not frequently talked about but they deserve more 
attention because they constitute the other side of the coin in fair use 
doctrine. The fair use test is routinely discussed in positive terms; it has 
been referred to by such terms as a “safety valve” for copyright law.210 And 
while this positive characterization is merited, it is useful to keep in mind 
that once one accepts that copyright protection is valid, and that its 
                                                                                                                     
should be considered among other factors in determining whether a use is fair and therefore not a 
copyright infringement).  
 203. See supra text accompanying notes 19–20; see also Hetcher, supra note 17, at 1898. 
 204. See Hetcher, supra note 17, at 1898. 
 205. JOHN STUART MILL , On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND UTILITARIANISM  3, 14 (Bantam Dell 
1993) (1859) (“[T]he only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of 
a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.”). 
 206. See Hetcher, supra note 17, at 1898. 
 207. See supra text accompanying note 23; see also Hetcher, supra note 17, at 1898. 
 208. Hetcher, supra note 17, at 1898 (emphasis omitted). 
 209. See supra Part III.B. 
 210. See Tenn. Fabricating Co. v. Moultrie Mfg. Co., 421 F.2d 279, 283 (5th Cir. 1970) 
(quoting John Schulman, Fair Use and the Revision of the Copyright Act, 53 IOWA L. REV. 832, 
832 (1968) as describing the fair use doctrine as a “‘balance wheel and safety valve for the 
copyright system’”). 
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justification is to promote creativity, then one is by logic committed to the 
idea that not all uses are fair and that unfair uses do not promote the goals 
of copyright. Accordingly, we must pay attention to the possibility of 
significant unfair uses of fan fiction and remix culture going forward.  
The above discussion has examined Lessig’s complex set of arguments 
all leading to the conclusion that amateur remix should be legalized. In 
sum, the arguments for moving away from the present regulatory regime 
were unconvincing because amateur remix is not criminal, and thus, there 
will be no stigmatizing of a whole generation of kids as criminals. Nor will 
institutions of learning suffer. Nor will a more generalized crime wave be 
unleashed upon society by rising generations that no longer show a general 
fidelity to the rule of law. Thus, Lessig has not provided reasons for 
moving away from the present regime. This conclusion is worth dwelling 
upon in the teeth of Lessig’s powerful rhetorical strategy of arguing for 
legalization in the negative, that is, as a better option than the present 
regime, simply because it does not suffer from the defects of the present 
regime. Structuring the argument in this manner allows the consideration 
as to whether legalization will create other problems to be left unaddressed. 
As the preceding examination has demonstrated, however, there are 
problems with legalization. In particular, significant uses, now deemed as 
strongly unfair by law and informal norms, would go unchecked, as we 
saw in the hypothetical example of full-length minor remixes of newly 
released films. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In light of the preceding discussion, we are now in a better position to 
appreciate the merits of the first policy proposal discussed above, namely, 
that a fault standard should be applied to amateur remix. As we saw, fair 
use allows us to draw the connection between copyright infringement and 
the desirability of a shift from strict liability to fault liability. Fair use has 
shifted from being the exception to being the rule in the context of fact 
patterns involving amateur digital remix. This means that more often than 
not when an amateur makes an unauthorized use, it is not an infringing act. 
This implies that typically there will not be a “substantial certainty” of 
causing harm when an actor engages in an activity that ends up harming 
another. Tort law generally takes very seriously the distinction between 
harms caused intentionally as compared to harms caused negligently. The 
former are intentional torts and the latter are negligence torts.  
As every first-year tort student knows, there are two sorts of intentions 
that can satisfy the “intentionally” requirement.211 The obvious sense of 
intentional harm is when the injurer has as her overt goal causing harm to 
the victim. The second sense is when an injurer takes an action in 
circumstances in which causing harm to the victim is “substantially 
certain,” although causing this harm is not a goal of the injurer.212 Much 
unauthorized copying of the sort we find in the copyright case law was 
                                                                                                                     
 211.  1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965). 
 212.  Id. 
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intentional infringement inasmuch as the facts of the cases involve acts of 
copying by defendants who were substantially certain to cause harm. This 
is because many of these unauthorized uses were commercial and in these 
circumstances fair use is unlikely. Indeed, there used to be a per se rule that 
commercial uses were treated as presumptively causing harm. Thus, in 
engaging in such copying, the copier was substantially certain to cause an 
unauthorized use. This is not true for instances in which amateur remixers 
use copyprotected material of others. Clearly, these uses are not authorized 
by the owner, but that is not the key question. The key question is whether 
the use is unauthorized, tout court. As we saw in the last Part, this is not 
the case because most amateur uses will be fair use and a fair use is a use 
authorized by the law.213  
Yet, not all uses by amateurs are fair uses. Some will be unfair because, 
for instance, they are little transformed and harmful to the owners’ 
markets. Thus, when an amateur makes a use unauthorized by the owner, 
she risks causing harm but the risk does not rise to the level of substantial 
certainty. This shifts those activities by amateurs into the category of 
generally socially valuable activities that unfortunately but unavoidably 
create risk for others. If one causes harm under these conditions, it will be 
by accident rather than intentionally. These are accidental infringements 
that are aptly adjudicated under a fault standard. Accordingly, most remix 
will be legal in the way that driving down the street is legal. One may 
engage in the activity with the freedom with which one engages in other 
legal activity, namely, one may do so as long as one does not negligently 
harm others in the process. By recognizing the harms as accidental, the law 
is de facto recognizing the behavior that caused the harm—apart from the 
misfortune that the risk of harm was realized—as legal and acceptable. It is 
recognized as having a social value. As a normative matter, it is at the least 
permitted. This represents a significant change from the past, in which 
copyright infringement has been routinely treated like an intentional tort—
like a punch in the nose. In ordinary parlance, we would say that punching 
someone in the nose is illegal. By contrast, accidentally hitting someone in 
the nose is only a civil wrong if one fails to exercise due care, in which 
case one committed a negligence tort.  
Compare the analysis to that provided by Lessig. As we saw above, he 
argues that remix uses are “presumptively illegal.” If Lessig were right, this 
would mean that a well-informed amateur contemplating an unauthorized 
use should presume that the behavior that she was about to engage in was 
illegal. But she would be wrong to make a presumption as her expectation 
in this regard should properly depend on whether a harm is substantially 
certain to result, and if not, whether there is nevertheless a risk of harm, 
and if so, whether she is exhibiting due care under the circumstances. If she 
reasonably believes that an unauthorized use is not substantially certain, 
and that she is being duly careful, then just the opposite of thinking herself 
to be acting presumptively illegally, she will reasonably believe herself to 
be acting quite legally.  
                                                                                                                     
 213.  17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006). 
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This, then, is the third way in which amateur digital remixers may be 
acting legally. This third way depends on a counterfactual policy shift in 
which a fault standard is to be implemented. As we saw above, the first 
way in which amateur remix may be legal—Lessig’s way—also depends 
on a counterfactual policy regime; one in which remix has been made legal 
by statute. It is only the second of the three ways—fair use—by which 
amateur-generated remix may be legal now in this world rather than 
counterfactually. Of the two counterfactual means in which amateur digital 
content might achieve legal status, for all the reasons provided above, 
clearly it is my contention that the better choice of the two is the one in 
which copyright law adopts a fault standard and proceeds to apply it when 
appropriate in disputes involving amateur-generated content.  
One response to this argument might be that even granting that it is 
persuasive, it nevertheless involves postulating a policy shift that, however, 
desirable in principle, is unlikely in practice if for no better reason than that 
the current regime of strict liability favors the more powerful, concentrated, 
and interested actors, the content industry. There is a large commentary on 
why such groups will tend to get their way legislatively.214 This is a serious 
point which must be addressed. Fortunately for the fault liability proposal, 
there is a compelling response and, moreover, one that favors this policy 
proposal over Lessig’s. The public choice point is standardly made in 
regard to legislative change, but the policy change I advocate could be 
furthered by courts. It was courts that originally shifted the standard from 
strict liability to negligence in tort generally, and there is no reason they 
could not do the same in copyright. There appears to be no provision in the 
Copyright Act that mandates strict liability. No less of public choice 
theorists than Richard Posner and William Landes have argued that courts 
are able to exercise more autonomy to do the right thing and follow their 
judicial consciences than are legislatures.215 They should be encouraged to 
do so in the context of amateur-generated content.  
Indeed, courts may find it necessary to adopt a set of changes in order to 
fully incorporate a fault standard. This Article has set out the basic 
argument for incorporation of the fault standard in copyright but much 
work is left to be done in order to more fully develop a free-standing tort 
theory of copyright, that is, copytort. Most striking, fault liability has 
implications for the issue of appropriate damages. In particular, in 
                                                                                                                     
 214.  See Derek J. Schaffner, Note, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act: Overextension of 
Copyright Protection and the Unintended Chilling Effects on Fair Use, Free Speech, and 
Innovation, 14 CORNELL J.L. &  PUB. POL’Y 145, 146 (2004). 
 215.  WILLIAM M. LANDES &  RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAW 416–17 (2003). Regarding the discussion of whether policy change is more feasible 
from a public choice perspective via legislation or through the courts, Lenz is a dramatic example of 
the power of courts. Lenz v. Universal Music Corp., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150, 1155 (N.D. Cal. 2008). 
The DMCA left it unaddressed, and so it is up to the courts as to whether a lack of fair use must be 
alleged by plaintiffs. By choosing to make this a requirement, the court was in effect adopting a 
fault standard, albeit one that looks to fair use rather than due care as the test for faulty behavior. 
This example illustrates that it is perfectly within a court’s ambit to charge plaintiffs with alleging a 
lack of due care on the part of defendant in cases involving amateur remix.  
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negligence law, punitive damages are not seen as appropriate.216 The 
obvious implication for the present context is to question the extent to 
which statutory damages as allowed under the Copyright Act are the moral 
equivalent of punitive damages. It is of interest to note in this connection 
that the Copyright Office, in its Report on Orphan Works, advocates for 
the creation of a safe harbor that would prominently feature the elimination 
of statutory damages.217 The qualification for inclusion in the safe harbor 
incorporates what is in effect a fault standard, as the proffered test is 
whether the user of the orphan work made a “reasonably diligent search” 
for the work’s owner.218 The arguable application to the present discussion 
is to conclude that statutory damages should not be allowed for amateur 
digital remix when it is to be judged under a fault standard because 
statutory damages function to more strongly penalize injuries just as do 
punitive damages in tort generally.   
A second apparent implication of taking fault seriously in copyright is 
that the issue is raised as to the proper burden of proof regarding fault. In 
tort generally, the plaintiff has the burden of proof to establish the 
defendant’s fault. Other things equal, one would expect a parallel structure 
to hold in copyright as well, such that the owner must allege the user’s 
negligence as part of plaintiff’s prima facie negligence suit. Note the 
difference here as compared to the current situation in copyright, in which 
the defendant has the burden to establish fair use. This sort of additional 
burden on defendant as compared to the situation in tort generally may or 
may not be justified for fair use, but regarding the fault standard, again, 
other things equal, one would expect the plaintiff to have the burden of 
establishing fault in copytort, just as is the case in tort generally. 
As these apparent implications of developing more fully a fault liability 
theory of copyright reveal, there is much work yet to be done in order to 
provide a comprehensive, top-down theoretical account of the connection 
between tort and copyright. This more thorough account shall be of interest 
in future scholarship as it potentially provides a response to the most 
salient rejoinder that can be made to the main claims that have been 
advanced in this Article. Specifically, a critic may charge that weighing 
factors such as the “transformative” nature of a work or the remix’s 
“informational” quality would provide little to no guidance to remixers on 
what is legal and will likely result in very fact-based lawsuits that may clog 
the courts. As the above discussion indicates, however, further 
implications of the fault standard as applied to copyright, such as a safe 
harbor for statutory damages and the burden of proof to show fault being 
on plaintiff, will have the effect that the cost to a potential plaintiff goes up 
and the benefit goes down, so by implication, there will be less incentive to 
                                                                                                                     
 216. GOLDBERG, SEBOK &  ZIPURSKY, supra note 39, at 493. 
 217. U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, supra note 80, at 8 (“[W]here the user cannot identify and locate 
the copyright owner after a reasonably diligent search, then the system should permit that specific 
user to make use of the work, subject to provisions that would resolve issues that might arise if the 
owner surfaces after the use has commenced.”). 
 218. Id. 
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sue, that is, less chilling effect on potential remixers. In particular, if 
statutory damages are disallowed, then the incentive to sue will, in the vast 
preponderance of instances, be diminished greatly as real damages caused 
to owners from instances of amateur digital remix will likely be de 
minimis. And the law wisely chooses not to concern itself with trifles. 
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